

AI 監獄ウイグル 原注・訳注

明記されていないかぎり、メイセム、アブドワリ、ユスフ、そのほかのウイグル人やカザフ人の難民のすべての証言の直接的な引用、およびファーウェイ、メグビー、センスタイムの従業員からの証言の直接的な引用は、著者自身のインタビュー取材によるもの。

[なおウェブサイトにつきましては、原書（『THE PERFECT POLICE STATE』）出版時のものであり、一部リンク切れ等、アクセス不能のものがございます。ご了承ください。（編集部）]

プロローグ その暗黒郷を“状況、と呼ぶ

- 1 2017年12月に新疆ウイグル自治区を訪れたとき、私 [以下「著者」] ははじめて“状況、 [ウイグル語の *weziyet*] というフレーズを耳にした。それは、新たに出現しつつある警察国家を表現するためにウイグル人ガイドが使った言葉だった。著者のアシスタントを務めてくれたウイグル人難民のアブドワリ・アユップがはじめてこのフレーズを耳にしたのは2016年1月のことで、中国を脱出してトルコに難民としてたどり着いたウイグル人のあいだでよく使われていたという。
- 2 Radio Free Asia, “Chinese Authorities Jail Four Wealthiest Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s Kashgar in New Purge,” January 5, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/wealthiest-01052018144327.html>.

第1章 中国の新たな征服地

- 1 Paul Mozur, “Looking through the Eyes of China’s Surveillance State,” *New York Times*, July 16, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/technology/china-surveillance-state.html>.
- 2 Joyce Liu and Wang Xiqing, “In Your Face: China’s All-Seeing State,” BBC News, December 10, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-42248056>.
- 3 Stephen Chen, “How Tensions with the West Are Putting the Future of China’s Skynet Mass Surveillance System at Stake,” *South China Morning Post*, September 23, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/2165372/how-tensions-west-are-putting-future-chinas-skynet-mass>.
- 4 Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region,” February 26, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region>.

- 5 Albert von Le Coq, *Buried Treasures of Chinese Turkestan: An Account of the Activities and Adventures of the Second and Third German Turfan Expeditions* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1928), 36, https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.279757/2015.279757.Buried-Treasures_djvu.txt. [ル・コック『中央アジア秘宝発掘記』木下龍也訳、中公文庫 BIBLO、2002年、39-40頁]
- 6 Peter Hopkirk, *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road*, paperback 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 2016), 9-12. [ピーター・ホップカーク『シルクロード発掘秘話』小江慶雄・小林茂訳、時事通信社、1981年、本文訳は訳者]
- 7 Rian Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 2-7, 196-97.
- 8 Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo* (New York: Penguin, 1958), 80-81. [マルコ・ポーロ『東方見聞録』]
- 9 Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Behind China’s \$1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order,” *New York Times*, May 13, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html>.
- 10 BBC News, “China to Try Eight People over Deadly Tiananmen Attack,” May 31, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27647842>. 以下も参照：Associated Press, “Urumqi Car and Bomb Attack Kills Dozens,” May 22, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/china-urumqi-car-bomb-attack-xinjiang>.
- 11 BBC News, “Four Charged over Kunming Mass Knife Attack,” June 30, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28085994>.
- 12 BBC News, “Imam of China’s Largest Mosque Killed in Xinjiang,” July 31, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28586426>.
- 13 Clifford Coonan, “Suspected Hijackers Die Following On-Board Flight,” *Irish Times*, July 3, 2012, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/suspected-hijackers-die-following-on-board-flight-1.527852>.
- 14 Sami Moubayed, *Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2015), 168. [サーミー・ムバイヤド『イスラーム国の黒旗のもとに 新たなるジハード主義の展開と深層』高尾賢一郎・福永浩一訳、青土社、2016年]
- 15 Xinhua, “Respected Imam’s Murder Is Anti-Humanity, Anti-Islam,” August 1, 2014, <http://en.people.cn/n/2014/0801/c90882-8764198.html>.
- 16 Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2004). [カーター・V・フィンンドリー『テュルクの歴史 古代から近現代まで』（世界歴史叢書）小松久男監訳、佐々木紳訳、明石書店、2017年]

- 17 James A. Millward, “Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,” *New York Review of Books*, February 7, 2019, <https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims>.
- 18 Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History*, 2–7, 171–77.
- 19 George Soros, *In Defense of Open Society* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 16–17.
- 20 “Facebook Shows Another Foreign Spy Hidden behind CNRP to Topple the Government,” *Fresh News*, August 24, 2017, <http://freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/63667-facebook-2.html>.
- 21 Erin Handley and Niem Chheng, “Filmmaker James Ricketson Charged,” *Phnom Penh Post*, June 9, 2017, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/filmmaker-james-ricketson-charged>.
- 22 “Latest Updates: CNRP Leader Kem Sokha Arrested for ‘Treason,’” *Cambodia Daily*, September 3, 2017, <https://english.cambodiadaily.com/news/nrp-leader-kem-sokha-arrested-treason-134249/>.
- 23 2017年8月と9月に放送されたカンボジア語のふたつのニュース映像より。著者が映像を保有。

第2章 国全体を監視装置に

i ミシェル・フーコー『監獄の誕生——監視と処罰』新装版、田村俣訳、新潮社、2020年、233–234頁、引用内ルビは訳者

- 1 Nanchang Public Security Bureau, “75 Behavioral Indicators of Religious Extremism,” September 8, 2015, <http://www.ncga.gov.cn/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=1256&id=5881>. このページはいつものまにか削除されていたものの、以下の記事に部分的な翻訳がある：Human Rights Watch, “‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” September 9, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#_ftn53.
- 2 *Egypt Independent*, “China to Invest \$11.2 Billion in Projects for Egypt’s New Administrative Capital,” September 4, 2017, <https://egyptindependent.com/china-invest-11-2-billion-projects-egypts-new-administrative-capital/>. 2016年9月から2017年9月にかけての安全保障およびインフラ計画に関するそのほかの合意の詳細については以下を参照：“Egypt, China Sign Technical Cooperation Document in Specialized Security Fields,” State Information Service of Egypt, June 20, 2017, <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/114496?lang=en-us> および “Egypt, China Sign Three MOUs on Security, Launching New Satellite, Electrical Rail Project,” *Enterprise*, September 6, 2017, <https://enterprise.press/stories/2017/09/06/egypt-china-sign-three-mous-on-security-launching-new-satellite-electrical-rail-project/>.

- 3 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China,” July 8, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/08/egypt-dont-deport-uyghurs-china#>.
- 4 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”
- 5 Al Jazeera, “Egypt Arrests Chinese Muslim Students amid Police Sweep,” July 7, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/7/egypt-arrests-chinese-muslim-students-amid-police-sweep>.
- 6 ワシントン DC にいるあいだに著者は、アスマンと彼の家族がフランスに避難する支援をした。一家はパリに飛行機で行き、亡命を申請した。
- 7 Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, and Christo Buschek, “China Secretly Built a Vast New Infrastructure to Imprison Muslims,” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-new-internment-camps-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims>. 記事はこう伝えている。「BuzzFeed News は、一般に公開されている衛星画像と、数十名の拘束経験者のインタビューをもとに、中国の収容所システムに関して過去に例のない広範な調査を実施した。その結果、2017 年以降、強制収容所の特徴を有する構造物が 260 以上も建設されたことが明らかになった。中国の西端にあたる新疆ウイグル自治区では、ほぼすべての県に、そうした施設が少なくともひとつは存在している」[日本語の翻訳記事：「中国政府、ウイグル自治区でイスラム教徒の強制収容所を拡大。衛星画像分析で明らかに」
<https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/meghara/china-new-internment-camps-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-1>]
- 8 Lao Mu, “Vocational Education and Training Centers in Xinjiang Represent New Path to Address Terrorism,” *People’s Daily Online*, September 10, 2019, <http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0910/c90000-9613730.html>.
- 9 Steven Jiang and Ben Westcott, “China’s Top Uyghur Official Claims Most Detainees Have Left Xinjiang Camps,” CNN.com, July 30, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/30/asia/xinjiang-official-beijing-camps-intl-hnk/index.html>.
- 10 Xinhua News Agency, “Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” October 16, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/16/c_137535821.htm.
- 11 Radio Free Asia, “Xinjiang Political ‘Re-Education Camps’ Treat Uyghurs ‘Infected by Religious Extremism’: CPP Youth League,” August 8, 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/infected-08082018173807.html>. RFA のジャーナリストたちは、新疆の中国共産主義青年団の役人の肉声の録音データを入手。ウイグル人の若者向けに中国のソーシャル・メディア内のグループに投稿されたもので、RFA はその内容の一部を翻訳した。

12 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” *New York Times*, November 16, 2019,

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html>.

13 著者によるインタビューにくわえ、以下の記事にも似た証言が記録されている：Alison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, “What They Saw: Ex-Prisoners Detail the Horrors of China’s Detention Camps,” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020,

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/china-ex-prisoners-horrors-xinjiang-camps-ughurs.

〔日本語の翻訳記事：「元収容者たちが語る、ウイグル自治区の強制収容所の過酷な現実。中で何が起きているのか」https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/alison_killing/china-ex-prisoners-horrors-xinjiang-camps-ughurs-1〕

14 インタビュー取材にくわえ、以下を参照した：Killing and Rajagopalan, “What They Saw”.

15 Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell after Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” *New York Times*, August 31, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-ughurs-prisons.html>.

16 漏洩した「中国電報 (China Cables)」は著者が保有。以下も参照：Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy.’”

17 Rajagopalan, Killing, and Buschek, “China Secretly Built a Vast New Infrastructure to Imprison Muslims.”

18 Rustem Shir, “Resisting Chinese Linguistic Imperialism: Abduweli Ayup and the Movement for Uyghur Mother Tongue-Based Education,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, May 2019,

https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_Resisting_Chinese_Linguistic_Imperialism_May_2019.pdf. 報道機関による記事や人権報告書では、アブドワリが強制収容所に3年間拘束されていたと誤って説明されていることが多い。アブドワリ本人が、4つの拘留センターで1年3カ月にわたって拘束されたというのが正しい情報だと説明した。

19 著者とメイセムは話し合いのうえ、簡単に人物を特定されるのを避けるため、社会科学のなかの正確な研究分野を明示しないことを決めた。

20 著者によるインタビュー取材のなかでも、似たような話がたびたび出てきた。一部の取材対象者は、中国の工作人員や中国国内の親戚からかかってきた電話の録音データを提供してくれた。以下も参照：Deutsche Welle (Germany), “How China intimidates Uighurs Abroad by Threatening Their Families,” July 11, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-intimidates-ughurs-abroad-by-threatening-their-families/a-49554977>.

第3章 ウイグル出身の賢い少女

- 1 メイセムがまだ子どもだった1990年代、冷戦が終わったところからウイグル族は民族としてのアイデンティティを主張しはじめた。その一例として、1997年には新疆のグルジャでデモが起きた。警察がデモ参加者に発砲し、おそらく数十人が死亡。ところが、公式には死者9名と発表された。自身がここで語るエピソードは、あくまで子どもの視点からのものだとメイセムは強調した。居心地のよい狭い世界で彼女は成長し、しかも家族は政治的に有利な立場に置かれていた。さらに当時のウイグル族への弾圧は、今日とは比べ物にならないほど緩やかなものだった。グルジャでのデモ、その後の拷問や処刑についてのくわしい情報については、1997年に放送されたイギリスのチャンネル4ニュースの映像を参照：<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RUCOrg2Pb0>.
- 2 Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests,” October 20, 2009, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/10/20/we-are-afraid-even-look-them/enforced-disappearances-wake-xinjiangs-protests>.
- 3 過激派のウイグル人戦闘員へのインタビュー取材（トルコ・イスタンブール、2018年2月～7月）。
- 4 Nate Rosenblatt, “All Jihad Is Local: What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its Fighters,” New America Foundation, July 2016, <https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/ISIS-Files.pdf>.
- 5 Kevin Wang, “Chinese City Bans Beards, Islamic-Style Clothing on Buses During Event,” CNN.com, August 7, 2014, <https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/asia/china-beard-ban/index.html>. 以下も参照：Sina News, “Xinjiang Karamay: Those with Large Beards and Four Kinds of Dressing Banned from Taking Buses (新疆克拉玛依：留大胡须等五种人员禁乘公交),” August 5, 2014, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-08-05/210530635703.shtml>. （アシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳）
- 6 Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses.” この2014年の規制の中国名は「新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例」。以下も参照：Xinhua, “Bans on Wearing Veils, Garment Covering Face in Public Places in Urumqi Are Approved (乌鲁木齐公共场所禁止穿戴蒙面罩袍的规定获批),” January 10, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/10/c_1113948748.htm. （アシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳）
- 7 Tom Phillips, “China Launches Massive Rural ‘Surveillance’ Project to Watch Over Uighurs,” *Telegraph*, October 19, 2014, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11150577/China-launches-massive-rural-surveillance-project-to-watch-over-Uighurs.html>.
- 8 Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History*, 23.

- 9 Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History*, 16. 「私は学識者にこう願います。この『タズキラ』に誤りや欠点があるとしても、追記のようなもので修正し、原形をとどめたまま全体を整えるべきである」と72ページに書かれている。この地域の歴史、つまりメイセムが愛した歴史は、「専門家ではなく大衆の参加によって作られた歴史であり、ヘロドトスの『歴史』や『スンジャタ叙事詩』というよりも、ウィキペディアに似たものである」と15ページで著者のリアン・トゥムは説明する。トゥムはこの地域を専門とする歴史家で、ロヨラ大学ニューオーリンズ校の教授。
- 10 Tian Han and Nie Er, “March of the Volunteers,” 1935, http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/16/content_23523.htm. [日本語訳は中華人民共和国駐日本国大使館のウェブサイトより：<http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/jbwzlm/zgbk/zgzd/t173445.htm>]
- 11 Frank Dikötter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962–1976* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2017), i–xix. 「人命損失という点では」とディケーターは説明する。「それ以前の多くの政治運動、とりわけ大躍進政策後の大飢饉による死者数をはるかに下回っていたものの、文化大革命は人々の生活や文化に深い爪痕を残した。文化大革命の一〇年間に殺害された人々の数は一五〇万人から二〇〇万人ほどだが、それをはるかに凌ぐ数の人々の人生が、際限なく続く吊し上げや、虚偽自白、批判闘争集会、迫害運動によって破壊された」[フランク・ディケーター『文化大革命 人民の歴史 1962-1976 (上)』谷川真一監訳、今西康子訳、人文書院、2020年、20頁]。以下も参照：Anne Thurston, *Enemies of the People* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 208–9.
- 12 Raisa Mirovitskaya and Andrei Ledovsky. “The Soviet Union and the Chinese Province of Xinjiang in the Mid-1930s,” *Far Eastern Affairs* 35, no. 4 (2007): 92–103. ワシントン DC にある「研究者のためのウッドロウ・ウィルソン国際センター」もまた、機密解除されたソ連の記録についての見事なオンライン・アーカイブを管理している：“China and the Soviet Union in Xinjiang, 1934–1949,” <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/234/china-and-the-soviet-union-in-xinjiang-1934-1949>.
- 13 James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2007).
- 14 Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, UK: Belknap Press, 2011), ch. 16, “Accelerating Economic Growth and Opening, 1982–1989,” 450–75, and ch. 24, “China Transformed,” 693–712, Kindle ed. [エズラ・F・ヴォーゲル『現代中国の父 鄧小平 (下)』「第16章 経済発展と対外開放の加速——1982～1989年」「第24章 中国の変容」益尾知佐子・杉本孝訳、日本経済新聞出版、2013年]
- 15 1990年代と2000年代の中国にたいする楽観的な考えは、当時一般的だったアメリカ政府の政策、新聞の論説、演説にも反映されていた。たとえば、以下のビル・クリントン大統領の演説を参照：President Bill Clinton, “Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill” (speech, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC,

March 9, 2000), recorded by the Federal News Service,

https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm.

クリントン大統領はこう述べた。「WTO への参加によって中国は、たんにわが国の製品をより多く輸入することに同意しているだけではなく、民主主義のもっとも大切な価値観のひとつである経済の自由を受け容れることに同意しているのです。中国が経済を自由化するほど、国民の可能性を解放することにつながり、彼らの自発性、卓越した進取の精神が完全に解き放たれるのです。そして、夢を見るだけでなく、夢を実現する力をもった個人は、より大きな発言権を求めることになるでしょう」。2001 年の中国の WTO 加盟にたいして懐疑的な見方をする人々は、ワシントン DC では保護貿易論者としばしば非難された。その代表格に、著名な貿易弁護士ロバート・E・ライトハイザーがいた：Robert E. Lighthizer, “A Deal We’d Be Likely to Regret,” *New York Times*, April 18, 1999, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/opinion/a-deal-wed-be-likely-to-regret.html>.

16 Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), ch. 5, “From Vanguard to Patriot: Reconstructing the Chinese Communist Party,” 119–41.

17 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Meet China’s Salman Rushdie,” *Foreign Policy*, October 1, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/01/china-xinjiang-islam-salman-rushdie-uighur/>. 電子書籍版のウイグル語の『自殺の芸術』は以下で入手可能：

https://elkitab.org/oluwelish_senitiperhat_tursun/.

トルスン本人と知り合いである以下の人々とのインタビューをとおして著者は、パルハット・トルスンの人生についてのくわしい情報を集めた。詩人のタヒル・ハムット、ジャーナリストで作家のエセツト・スライマン、言語学者のアブドワリ・アユップ。著者自身はトルスンに直接インタビューすることはできなかった。shahit.biz の被害者データベースによると、トルスンは 2018 年 1 月に新疆で拘束され、のちに長期刑を言い渡されたと推察されている：

<https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=2>.

18 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Meet China’s Salman Rushdie.”

第 4 章 中国テック企業の台頭

1 David Kirkpatrick, “How Microsoft Conquered China,” *Fortune*, July 17, 2007, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/07/23/100134488/.

2 Robyn Meredith, “(Microsoft’s) Long March,” *Forbes*, February 17, 2003, <https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0217/078.html?sh=86a319f6802c>.

3 Kirkpatrick, “How Microsoft Conquered China.”

- 4 Kirkpatrick, “How Microsoft Conquered China.”
- 5 Mara Hvistendahl, “China’s Tech Giants Want to Go Global. Just One Thing Might Stand in Their Way,” *MIT Technology Review*, December 19, 2018, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/12/19/138226/chinas-tech-giants-want-to-go-global-just-one-thing-might-stand-in-their-way/>.
- 6 Sunray Liu, “Microsoft Builds R&D Dream Team in Beijing,” *EE Times*, September 3, 1999, <https://www.eetimes.com/microsoft-builds-rd-dream-team-in-beijing/>.
- 7 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 4-5. [李開復 (カイク・リー) 『AI 世界秩序 米中が支配する「雇用なき未来」』 上野元美訳、日本経済新聞出版、2020 年、15 頁]
- 8 Good Morning America, “Casper: Apple’s initial Voice First System from 1992,” posted by YouTube user Brian Roemmele on January 21, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8De_KxYt1pQ. この映像は 1992 年に *Good Morning America* 内で放送されたもの。
- 9 Wang Jingjing, “The ‘Whampoa Academy’ of China’s Internet,” *People* (China), <https://www.weibo.com/p/1001643998598932131471>. この記事は標準中国語で書かれたもの。オックスフォード大学の博士課程の学生で、オックスフォード大学・人類の未来研究所のローズ奨学生であるジェフ・ディン (Jeff Ding) がこの記事を翻訳し、自身が運営するウェブサイト「ChinAI Newsletter」に掲載した。「しかし 1998 年春、シリコンバレーにある SGI という会社の副代表を務めていた KFL (カイク・リー) は、“スランプ、に陥っていた」と記事は伝える。「彼らが作る製品はあまりに先進的であり、販売市場を見つけることができなかつたため、カイク・リーは自身が経営するマルチメディア会社を売却せざるをえなくなった」。ディンの翻訳記事は以下で閲覧可能：<https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-37-happy-20th-anniversary>.
- 10 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 89. [『AI 世界秩序』 126 頁]
- 11 Hvistendahl, “China’s Tech Giants Want to Go Global. Just One Thing Might Stand in Their Way.”
- 12 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 16. [『AI 世界秩序』 30 頁]
- 13 以下も参照：Richard P. Appelbaum, et al., *Innovation in China: Challenging the Global Science and Technology System* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2018), 8 and ch. 5, “How Effective Is China’s State-Led Approach to High-Tech Development?” 著者のアッペルバウム (Appelbaum) らは、中国のイノベーション・モデルを「“国家主導の強引な開発、と“制約のない自由な企業活動、のしばしば矛盾した混合物」と総括する。
- 14 Elizabeth C. Economy, *The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), ch. 3, “ChinaNet,” 55–90.

- 15 Joseph Kahn, "Yahoo Helped Chinese to Prosecute Journalist," *New York Times*, September 8, 2005, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/08/business/worldbusiness/yahoo-helped-chinese-to-prosecute-journalist.html>.
- 16 G. Elijah Dann and Neil Haddow, "Just Doing Business or Doing Just Business: Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and the Business of Censoring China's Internet," *Journal of Business Ethics* 79, no. 3 (2008): 219–34, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25075661?seq=1>. 英語版の誓約文の全文は以下で閲覧可能: *China Daily*, "Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China [sic] Internet Industry" (中国互联网行业自律公约), March 26, 2002, <http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201812/26/WS5c23261f498eb4f01ff253d2/public-pledge-of-self-regulation-and-professional-ethics-for-china-internet-industry.html>.
- 17 Economy, *The Third Revolution*, ch. 3, "ChinaNet," 63–65.
- 18 Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, "A New Direction for China's Defense Industry," 205, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG334.html>.
- 19 Chinese Academy of Sciences, "Issues in Building a National Innovation System," *High Technology Development Report* (高技术发展报告), Beijing, 2005, http://www.bdp.cas.cn/zlyjjwqgl/ptcg/201608/t20160830_4572983.html.
- 20 James Palmer, "Nobody Knows Anything About China," *Foreign Policy*, March 21, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/21/nobody-knows-anything-about-china/>.
- 21 Citi Research, "Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology," August 4, 2015, <https://img3.gelonghui.com/pdf201508/pdf20150805155951188.pdf>.
- 22 新疆でのファーウェイの関与についてのイルファンの説明は、中国のテクノロジー企業の活動に関するオーストラリア戦略政策研究所 (ASPI) の調査結果と一致している。参照: ASPI, "Mapping China's Tech Giants: Huawei," <https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/huawei>. 彼の説明はさらに、監視技術に関連するニュースを掲載するウェブサイト IPVM による調査結果とも一致している。参照: Charles Rollet, "Dahua and Hikvision Win over \$1 Billion in Government-Backed Projects in Xinjiang," IPVM, April 23, 2018, <https://ipvm.com/reports/xinjiang-dahua-hikvision>.
- 23 映像監視の歴史の詳細については以下を参照: John Honovich, "Video Surveillance History," IPVM, December 15, 2020, <https://ipvm.com/reports/history-video-surveillance>.
- 24 Honovich, "Video Surveillance History."
- 25 Olivia Carville and Jeremy Kahn, "China's Hikvision Has Probably Filmed You," *Bloomberg Quint*, May 23, 2019, <https://www.bloombergquint.com/technology/china-s-hikvision-weighed-for-u-s-ban-has-probably-filmed-you>.

- 26 イルファンは著者のために、カメラ監視システムが設置され、政府や企業の制御室に接続される一連の流れについて詳細な図表を描いて説明してくれた。これらの図表は著者が保有。
- 27 Steven Millward, “WeChat is 5 years old. Here’s how it’s grown,” *Tech in Asia*, January 21, 2016, <https://www.techinasia.com/5-years-of-wechat>.
- 28 Steven Millward, “Tencent CEO: Weixin Group Messaging App Hits 100 Million Users,” *Tech in Asia*, March 29, 2012, <https://www.techinasia.com/tencent-weixin-100-million-users>.
- 29 Steven Millward, “Just Short of 2 Years Old, WeChat App Surpasses 300 Million Users,” *Tech in Asia*, January 16, 2013, <https://www.techinasia.com/confirmed-wechat-surpasses-300-million-users>.
- 30 Associated Press, “Number of Active Users at Facebook over the Years,” October 24, 2012, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/number-active-users-facebook-over-years-214600186--finance.html>. Jemima Kiss, “Twitter Reveals It Has 100M Active Users,” *Guardian*, September 8, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/pda/2011/sep/08/twitter-active-users>.
- 31 Zheping Huang, “All the Things You Can—and Can’t—Do with Your WeChat Account in China,” *Quartz*, December 28, 2017, <https://qz.com/1167024/all-the-things-you-can-and-cant-do-with-your-wechat-account-in-china/>. 著者は2012年から2016年にかけて自身で微信を利用し、この記事で紹介されていない機能についてもみずから確認した。2016年に著者は、中国国内の情報提供者を守るために微信の利用を中止した。
- 32 BBC, “Timeline: China’s Net Censorship,” June 29, 2010, <https://www.bbc.com/news/10449139>.
- 33 イルファンは、微信をとおした監視の仕組みの技術的側面について詳細な図表を描いて説明してくれた。図表は著者が保有。微信の監視についてのイルファンの説明は、著者がインタビュー取材したべつのウイグル人の元技術労働者の説明と一致している。くわえて、微信の疑わしい利用という理由で警察に摘発され、中国国内で拘束されたほかのウイグル人の多くの証言の内容とも一致する。たとえば、2013年に微信の利用を理由に拘束されたあるウイグル人女性の以下のエピソードを参照：Isobel Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,” *Wired*, May 9, 2019, <https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/>.
- 34 参照：Amnesty International, “How Private Are Your Favourite Messaging Apps?,” October 21, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/10/which-messaging-apps-best-protect-your-privacy/>. アムネスティ・インターナショナルはこう指摘する。「テンセントは、微信とQQという中国でもっとも人気のあるふたつのメッセージング・アプリを所有している。しかし、われわれの調査によるメッセージのプライバシーのスコアは最下位で、100点満点中0点。まず、一般的なプライバシーの基準をひとつも満たしていない。それどころかテンセントは、『“バックドア”を構築して暗号化されたメッセージへのアクセスを許可しろ』という政府からの要請を拒否する姿勢を表明していない唯一の企業である」

第5章 ディープ・ニューラル・ネットワーク

- 1 Jessica Brum, “Technology Transfer and China’s WTO Commitments,” *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 50 (2018): 709–43, <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2019/10/GT-GJIL190043.pdf>.
- 2 Remco Zwetsloot, “China’s Approach to Tech Talent Competition: Policies, Results, and the Developing Global Response,” in report series *Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_china_talent_policy_zwetsloot.pdf.
- 3 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 6–8. [『AI 世界秩序』 20 頁]
- 4 この章のディープ・ニューラル・ネットワークの説明については、グーグルの元 AI 開発者に執筆を手伝ってもらった。心より感謝したい。
- 5 Michael Chui, James Manyika, Mehdi Miremadi, Nicolaus Henke, Rita Chung, Pieter Nel, and Sankalp Malhotra. “Notes from the AI Frontier: Applications and Value of Deep Learning,” McKinsey Global Institute, April 17, 2018, <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/notes-from-the-ai-frontier-applications-and-value-of-deep-learning#>.
- 6 Andrew Ross Sorkin and Steve Lohr, “Microsoft to Buy Skype for \$8.5 Billion,” *New York Times*, May 10, 2011, <https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/microsoft-to-buy-skype-for-8-5-billion/>.
- 7 The World Bank, “Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population)—China,” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=CN>.
- 8 China Internet Network Information Center, “The Internet Timeline of China (2011),” February 19, 2013, https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/hlwfzdsj/201302/t20130219_38709.htm.
- 9 Dave Gershgorn, “The Inside Story of How AI Got Good Enough to Dominate Silicon Valley,” *Quartz*, June 18, 2018, <https://qz.com/1307091/the-inside-story-of-how-ai-got-good-enough-to-dominate-silicon-valley/>.
- 10 グーグルの元 AI 開発者が、インタビュー取材のなかで GPU の技術的および商業的な利用について説明してくれた。
- 11 Allison Linn, “Microsoft Researchers Win ImageNet Computer Vision Challenge,” *AI Blog*, Microsoft, December 10, 2015, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/microsoft-researchers-win-imagenet-computer-vision-challenge/>.
- 12 Crunchbase, “Series A—MEGVII,” announcement of Series A funding round, July 18, 2013, https://www.crunchbase.com/funding_round/megvii-technology-series-a--927a6b8b.

- 13 Shu-Ching Jean Chen, “SenseTime: The Faces behind China’s Artificial Intelligence Unicorn,” *Forbes Asia*, March 7, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shuchingjeanchen/2018/03/07/the-faces-behind-chinas-omniscient-video-surveillance-technology/?sh=5efc95584afc>.
- 14 Chen, “SenseTime.”
- 15 Ryan Mac, Rosalind Adams, and Megha Rajagopalan, “US Universities and Retirees Are Funding the Technology behind China’s Surveillance State,” BuzzFeed News, May 30, 2019, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/us-money-funding-facial-recognition-sensetime-megvii>.
- 16 Nvidia, “AI Powered Facial Recognition for Computers with SenseTime,” posted by YouTube user NVIDIA on June 7, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMUmPumXtpw>. この映像は、2016年にエヌビディアが開催した Emerging Companies Summit で撮影された。
- 17 Aaron Tilley, “The New Intel: How Nvidia Went from Powering Video Games to Revolutionizing Artificial Intelligence,” *Forbes*, November 30, 2016, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2016/11/30/nvidia-deep-learning-ai-intel/?sh=ba1b3777ff1e>.
- 18 Paul Mozur and Don Clark, “China’s Surveillance State Sucks Up Data,” *New York Times*, November 24, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html>.
- 19 Nvidia, “AI Powered Facial Recognition.”
- 20 Nvidia, “AI Powered Facial Recognition.”
- 21 Nvidia, “AI Powered Facial Recognition.”
- 22 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 104–5. [『AI 世界秩序』145 頁]
- 23 Zhang Ye, “Translation Tech Booms in Xinjiang,” *Global Times*, April 26, 2017, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044253.shtml>.
- 24 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants: AI and Surveillance,” Issues Paper No. 24, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 28, 2019, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants>.
- 25 Alexandra Harney, “Risky Partner: Top U.S. Universities Took Funds from Chinese Firm Tied to Xinjiang Security,” Reuters, June 13, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-mit-tech-insight-idUSKCN1TE04M>.
- 26 Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants.” 以下も参照：Huawei Cloud, “Xinjiang Holds Hands with Huawei Cloud, Promotes ‘Tianshan Cloud’ Application (新疆携手华为企业云 推进“天山云”应用),” December 15, 2015, https://www.huaweicloud.com/news/1450167655_133.html.

- 27 *Forbes*, “Ren Zhengfei,” <https://www.forbes.com/profile/ren-zhengfei/?sh=3516b5cd2e6e>.
- 28 *Straits Times*, “Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei Survived a Famine, but Can He Weather President Trump?,” December 10, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/huaweis-ceo-ren-zhengfei-survived-a-famine-can-he-weather-president-trump>.
- 29 ウィリアム・ブラマー、およびアメリカ支社と中国本社のほかの3人のファーウェイ従業員へのインタビュー取材（2020年7月8日）
- 30 Chen, “How Tensions with the West Are Putting the Future of China’s Skynet Mass Surveillance System at Stake.”
- 31 National Security Agency, “Why We Care,” Codeword “Shotgiant,” January 1, 2010, released March 22, 2014, https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/Shotgiant2014-03-22_nsadocs_snowden_doc.
- 32 David E. Sanger and Nicole Periroth, “N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat,” *New York Times*, March 22, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html>.
- 33 Sanger and Periroth, “N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat.”
- 34 Michael S. Schmidt, Keith Bradsher, and Christine Hauser, “U.S. Panel Cites Risks in Chinese Equipment,” *New York Times*, October 8, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/us-panel-calls-huawei-and-zte-national-security-threat.html>
- 35 Natasha Khan, Dan Strumpf, and Wenxin Fan, “The Public Face of Huawei’s Global Fight,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 19, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-public-face-of-huaweis-global-fight-11547874008>.
- 36 Von Jacob Appelbaum, Judith Horchert, and Christian Stöcker, “Catalog Advertises NSA Toolbox,” *Der Spiegel*, December 29, 2013, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html>.
- 37 Glenn Greenwald, “How the NSA Tampers with US-Made Internet Routers,” *Guardian*, May 12, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/12/glenn-greenwald-nsa-tampers-us-internet-routers-snowden>. シスコはNSAへの対抗策として、偽の住所と人物宛てに商品を配送した。参照：Darren Pauli, “Cisco Posts Kit to Empty Houses to Dodge NSA Chop Shops,” *Register*, March 18, 2015, https://www.theregister.com/2015/03/18/want_to_dodge_nsa_supply_chain_taps_ask_cisco_for_a_dead_drop/.
- 38 National Security Agency, “HALLUXWATER: Ant Product Data,” June 24, 2008, 5, https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/06/20131230-appelbaum-nsa_ant_catalog.pdf.

- 39 Paul Sandle and Jane Barrett, “Huawei CEO Says Not Surprised by U.S. Spying Reports,” *Reuters*, May 3, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-huawei-tech-ren/huawei-ceo-says-not-surprised-by-u-s-spying-reports-idINKBN0DI18B20140502>.
- 40 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” *New York Times*, September 22, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>.
- 41 Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan.”
- 42 Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, “Japan Retreats with Release of Chinese Boat Captain,” *New York Times*, September 24, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/asia/25chinajapan.html>.
- 43 Yoko Kubota, “Japan Releases China Fishing Boat Captain: Report,” *Reuters*, September 24, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-idUSTRE68I06520100924>.
- 44 Gary Brown and Christopher D. Yung, “Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement, Part 1: The US Approach to Cyberspace,” *Diplomat*, January 19, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-to-cyberspace/>.
- 45 *Reuters*, “Google Exit Appears to Benefit Top China Rival, Baidu,” April 29, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/technology/30baidu.html>.

第6章 「中国を倒せ！」 「共産党を倒せ！」

- 1 ウイグル族と漢族がお互いをどのように見ているかについては、インタビューする人によって多種多様な差や複雑さがあった。このトピックに関する有益な研究は以下を参照：Tom Cliff, *Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
- 2 Charlotte Brontë, *Jane Eyre: An Autobiography* (London: Service & Paton, 1897), ch. 23, 英語版はプロジェクト・グーテンベルクによってオンライン上で公開されている：
<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1260/1260-h/1260-h.htm>. [日本語訳は以下より：C・ブロンテ『ジェーン・エア（下）』大久保康雄訳、新潮文庫、1954年、Kindle版]
- 3 Andrew Jacobs, “At a Factory, the Spark for China’s Violence,” *New York Times*, July 15, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/world/asia/16china.html>.
- 4 Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them.”
- 5 Agence France-Presse, “Footage of the 2009 Ethnic Violence in Xinjiang,” July 4, 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEz4frM0riA>.

- 6 BBC, “Xinjiang Arrests ‘Now over 1,500,’ August 3, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8181563.stm>.
- 7 Ben Blanchard, “China Tightens Web Screws after Xinjiang Riot,” Reuters, July 6, 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-internet-idUSTRE5651K420090706>.
- 8 Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them.”
- 9 Ilham Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen,” Pen America, April 9, 2014, <https://pen.org/my-ideals-and-the-career-path-i-have-chosen/>. 中国語のオリジナル・バージョン : https://s3.amazonaws.com/wenyunchao_share/Ilham_01.html.
- 10 Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen.”
- 11 Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen.”
- 12 Cliff. *Oil and Water*, ch. 1, “Constructing the Civilized City,” 27–49.
- 13 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps,” white paper, October 5, 2014, <http://english.sina.com/china/2014/1004/742790.html>. 中国語のオリジナル・バージョン : <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/Document/1382598/1382598.htm>. この政府白書は、兵団についてのプロパガンダ的な歴史であり、その主張を鵜呑みにするべきではない。むしろ、中国が兵団の歴史をどのように見ているのかを知るのに役立つ。
- 14 Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 178–234.
- 15 Thomas Matthew and James Cliff, “Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang *Bingtuan* in the Twenty-first Century,” *Asian Studies Review* 33 (March 2009), 83–106.
- 16 ウイグル族と漢族の元新疆住民へのインタビュー取材 (2017 年、2018 年)。以下も参照 : Cliff, *Oil and Water*, ch. 5, “Lives of *Guanxi*,” 144–48.
- 17 Ilham Tohti, translated by Cindy Carter, “Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations,” *Daxiong Gonghui*, https://ilhamtohtisite.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-ughur-autonomous-region-overview-and-recommendations_complete-translation3.pdf. 正確な発表日は不明だが、トフティが 2014 年 1 月に逮捕されてしばらくしてからこの記事がウェブサイト Daxiong Gonghui (大象公会) に掲載された。トフティは 2011 年から 2013 年にかけてこの記事を執筆・修正した。
- 18 Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen.”
- 19 Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen.”
- 20 Tohti, “My Ideals and the Career Path I Have Chosen.”

第7章 習近平主席の「非対称」の戦略

ii 中国共産党第19回全国代表大会での発言。日本語訳は新華社通信ウェブサイトより：

http://jp.xinhuanet.com/2017-10/28/c_136711568.htm

1 Barbara Demick, “‘Red Song’ Campaign in China Strikes Some False Notes,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 3, 2011, <https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2011-jun-03-la-fg-china-red-20110604-story.html>.

2 Austin Ramzy, “The 2010 TIME 100: Bo Xilai,” *Time*, April 29, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1984685_1984864_1985416,00.html.

3 Ian Johnson, “China’s Falling Star,” *New York Review of Books*, March 19, 2012, <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2012/03/19/chinas-falling-star-bo-xilai/>.

4 Pin Ho and Wenguang Huang, *A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel: Murder, Money, and an Epic Power Struggle in China* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 165–74.

5 Chun Han Wong, “Chinese Court Commutes Sentence for Gu Kailai to Life in Prison,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-court-commutes-sentence-for-gu-kailai-to-life-in-prison-1450102422>.

6 Jeremy Page, “Bo Xilai Found Guilty, Sentenced to Life in Prison,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 22, 2013, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303730704579090080547591654>.

7 著者は、中国の指導者（中国語では「中華人民共和国主席」）を説明するときに「President」ではなく「Chairman」という敬称を使いたい。なぜなら、それがはるかに正確な翻訳だからだ。中国政府は、英語の資料でこの敬称を「President」と訳すことを好み、より大きな権威を与え、独裁支配を正当化しようとする。しかし実際には、正しい翻訳は「Chairman」である。参照：Isaac Stone Fish, “Stop Calling Xi Jinping ‘President,’” *Slate*, August 8, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/xi-jinping-president-chairman-title.html>.

8 Chris Buckley and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Cultural Revolution Shaped Xi Jinping, from Schoolboy to Survivor,” *New York Times*, September 24, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html>.

9 US Embassy Beijing, “Portrait of Vice President Xi Jinping,” cable, November 16, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING3128_a.html.

10 Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” *New Yorker*, April 6, 2015, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red>.

- 11 James Palmer, “China’s Overrated Technocrats,” *Foreign Policy*, July 4, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/04/chinas-overrated-technocrats-stem-engineering-xi-jinping/>.
- 12 Economy, *The Third Revolution*, 5.
- 13 同上
- 14 François Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping* (London: Hurst, 2018), ch. 1, “The Renaissance Man,” 16.
- 15 Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*, introduction, “The Chinese Dream,” 7–8.
- 16 Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*, ch. 9, “Shedding the Low Profile,” 184–85.
- 17 Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*, ch. 1, “The Renaissance Man,” 17.
- 18 Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*, ch. 9, “Shedding the Low Profile,” 188.
- 19 “Profile: Xi Jinping: Pursuing the Dream for 1.3 billion Chinese,” Xinhua, March 17, 2013, <http://en.people.cn/90785/8170522.html>. 著者は以下の翻訳を利用：Economy, *The Third Revolution*, 4.
- 20 Wang Jisi, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” in Shao Binhong, *The World in 2020 According to China: Chinese Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2014), ch. 6, 129–36. この記事のオリジナル中国語版は以下に掲載された： *Global Times*, October 17, 2012.
- 21 Xi Jinping, “Promote Friendship between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future,” speech, Nazabayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan, September 7, 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml. [日本語訳は以下の中華人民共和国駐日本国大使館のウェブサイト上の記事を参照した：「人民の友情を広く発揚し、共にすばらしい未来を開こう——ナザルバエフ大学における講演」 <http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/zgyw/t1076413.htm>]
- 22 Kent E. Calder, *Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019), ch. 1, “Eurasian Reconnection and Renaissance,” loc. 206, Kindle ed. [ケント・E・カルダー『スーパー大陸 ユーラシア統合の地政学』「第1章 ユーラシアの再連結とルネッサンス」杉田弘毅監訳、潮出版社、2019年]
- 23 Geoff Wade, “The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment,” *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 78, no. 1 (2005): 37–58, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41493537>.
- 24 Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World* (New York: Vintage, 2015). 前半の236ページでは、ヨーロッパの台頭以前におけるシルクロードの多くの帝国と人々について詳細に描かれている。[ピーター・フランコパン『シルクロード全史 文明と欲望の十字路（上・下）』須川綾子訳、河出書房新社、2020年]

- 25 Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, ch. 13, “The Road to Northern Europe,” and ch. 14, “The Road to Empire,” 243–279. [フランコパン『シルクロード全史』「13章 北ヨーロッパへの道」「14章 帝国への道」]
- 26 Howard W. French, *Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power* (New York: Knopf, 2017), introduction, 11–13.
- 27 Bill Hayton, *The Invention of China* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), introduction and ch. 2, “The Invention of Sovereignty,” 12, 50–91. ヘイトンをはじめとする近年の研究者たちの多くは、「国家的屈辱の世紀」とは、中国国民から自分たちで歴史を作る力を奪うために共産党が発明したものであり、独裁政権の維持のために有益なツールであると主張している。
- 28 Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, chs. 14–20, 264–398. 『シルクロード全史』後半では、ヨーロッパの台頭がもたらしたユーラシア帝国の衰退について詳細に描かれている。
- 29 Calder, *Super Continent*, ch. 1, “Eurasian Reconnection and Renaissance,” loc. 237, Kindle ed. [カルダー『スーパー大陸』「第1章 ユーラシアの再連結とルネッサンス」]
- 30 Chris Buckley and Paul Mozur, “What Keeps Xi Jinping Awake at Night,” *New York Times*, May 11, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-national-security.html>.
- 31 Calder, *Super Continent*, introduction, locs. 121–96, Kindle ed. [カルダー『スーパー大陸』「序章」]
- 32 Calder, *Super Continent*, ch. 1, “Eurasian Reconnection and Renaissance,” loc. 302, Kindle ed. [カルダー『スーパー大陸』「第1章 ユーラシアの再連結とルネッサンス」25頁]
- 33 Kevin Yao and Aileen Wang, “China’s 2013 Economic Growth Dodges 14-Year Low but Further Slowing Seen,” Reuters, January 20, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-gdp-idUSBREA0I0HH20140120>.
- 34 漏洩した「新疆文書」(Xinjiang Papers) は著者が保有。以下も参照：Ramzy and Buckley, “Absolutely No Mercy.”
- 35 Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*, ch. 1, “The Renaissance Man,” 20.
- 36 Andrew Jacobs, “Beijing Crash May Be Tied to Unrest in Xinjiang,” *New York Times*, October 28, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/beijing-restricts-coverage-after-car-explodes-at-forbidden-city.html>.
- 37 BBC, “Tiananmen Crash: China Police ‘Detain Suspects,’” October 30, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24742810>.
- 38 Andrew Jacobs, “China Strips Army Official of Position after Attack,” *New York Times*, November 3, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/asia/china-demotes-a-military-commander-after-attack-in-beijing.html>.

- 39 Gerry Shih, “AP Exclusive: Uighurs Fighting in Syria Take Aim at China,” Associated Press, December 23, 2017, <https://apnews.com/article/79d6a427b26f4eeab226571956dd256e>.
- 40 Keira Lu Huang, “SWAT Team Leader ‘Gunned Down Five Kunming Terrorists in 15 Seconds,’” *South China Morning Post*, March 4, 2014, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1439991/swat-team-leader-gunned-down-five-kunming-terrorists-15-seconds>.
- 41 Hannah Beech, “Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs,” *Time*, March 1, 2014, <https://time.com/11687/deadly-terror-attack-in-southwestern-china-blamed-on-separatist-muslim-uighurs/>.
- 42 Xinhua, “Nothing Justifies Civilian Slaughter in China’s ‘9-11,’” *Global Times*, March 2, 2014, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/845570.shtml>.
- 43 World Uyghur Congress, “World Uyghur Congress Urges Calm and Caution after Beijing Incident on October 28, 2013,” October 29, 2013, <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/world-uyghur-congress-urges-calm-and-caution-after-beijing-incident-on-october-28-2013/>.
- 44 Hannah Beech, “In China, Deadly Bomb and Knife Attack Rocks Xinjiang Capital,” *Time*, April 30, 2014, <https://time.com/83727/in-china-deadly-bomb-and-knife-attack-rocks-xinjiang-capital/>.
以下も参照：Xinhua, “Bombing at Urumqi South Railway Station solved (乌鲁木齐火车南站暴恐袭击案告破),” May 1, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140903125343/http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2014-05/01/c_1110500096.htm. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳)
- 45 Andrew Jacobs, “In China’s Far West, a City Struggles to Move On,” *New York Times*, May 23, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/world/asia/residents-try-to-move-on-after-terrorist-attack-in-china.html>.
- 46 漏洩した中国政府の文書は著者が保有。以下も参照：Ramzy and Buckley, “Absolutely No Mercy.”

第8章 対テロ戦争のための諜報員

- 1 James Millward, “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment,” *Policy Studies* 6 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tmf/private/PS006.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=3200>.
- 2 中国の元スパイであるユスフ・アメットへのインタビュー取材（トルコ）

- 3 Al Jazeera, “The Guantanamo 22,” Al Jazeera, December 9, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/featured-documentaries/2015/12/9/the-guantanamo-22/>. この記事で紹介されているパトリシオ・ヘンリケス (Patricio Henriquez) 監督のドキュメンタリー作品 *Uyghurs: Prisoners of the Absurd* はオンライン上では現在は視聴不可。著者は全篇の映像を保有。以下も参照：Richard Bernstein, “When China Convinced the U.S. That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad,” *Atlantic*, March 19, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/us-uyghurs-guantanamo-china-terror/584107/>.
- 4 Sean R. Roberts, *The War on the Uyghurs: China’s Internal Campaign Against a Muslim Minority* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 110–11.
- 5 Al Jazeera, “The Guantanamo 22.”
- 6 以下も参照：Roberts, *The War on the Uyghurs*, 70–71.
- 7 Al Jazeera, “The Guantanamo 22.”
- 8 Roberts, *The War on the Uyghurs*, 80–81.
- 9 Al Jazeera, “The Guantanamo 22.”
- 10 US Department of State, “China: Country of Origin Information (COI) Report,” Home Office of the United Kingdom, UK Border Agency, August 24, 2011, <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/12/china-0811.pdf>.
- 11 Al Jazeera, “The Guantanamo 22.”
- 12 Nathan Vanderklippe, “After Guantanamo, Life on Pacific Island Was Difficult,” *Globe and Mail*, June 28, 2015, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/after-guantanamo-life-on-pacific-island-was-difficult/article25172787/>.
- 13 グアantanamo・キャンプに収容されていた3人の元ウイグル人へのインタビュー取材（トルコ、2018年4月～7月）。
- 14 ユスフは、中国諜報機関との WhatsApp の会話と音声記録をすべて著者に提供してくれた。これらのファイルは著者が保有。

第9章 「政府はわたしたちを信用していない」

- 1 これらのフェイスブックのメッセージは著者が保有。
- 2 “She Comes Not to Me,” translated by Victoria Rowe Holbrook and Mücahit Kaçar, from Kaya Türkay, *Alî-Sîr Nevâyî: Bedâiyü'l-Vasat, Üçüncü Dîvân* (Ankara, Turkey: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2002), 441.

- 3 Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: At Least 1000 People Executed in ‘Strike Hard’ Campaign against Crime,” June 30, 1996,
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/072/1996/en/>.
- 4 数多くのニュース記事が、政府による初期の「信用度」と「社会ランキング」システムは2015年から2017年にかけて構築されたと伝えている。しかし、10人以上のウイグル人とカザフ人の難民が著者にたいし、新疆では少なくとも2014年から粗削りの「信用度」システムが運用されていたと語った。社会信用システムの概要を政府がはじめて文書で公表したのは、2014年6月のことだった。参照：State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020),” June 14, 2014,
<https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/>. オリジナルの中国語バージョン：
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm.
- 5 Sarah Cook, “Islam: Religious Freedom in China,” *Freedom House*, 2017,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/2017/battle-china-spirit-islam-religious-freedom#footnote16_b6wryn6. この *Freedom House* の記事内の「安全保障にまつわる容疑で592人のウイグル人が裁判にかけられた」という情報は、*Dui Hua Human Rights Journal* からの引用。*Dui Hua* は、以下の記事内にリストアップされているオンライン上の政府の情報にもとづいて人数を割りだした：
<https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2015/03/xinjiang-state-security-trials-flat.html>.
- 6 Joanne Smith Finley, “Securitization, Insecurity and Conflict in Contemporary Xinjiang: Has PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved into State Terror?” *Central Asian Survey* 38, no. 1(2019), 1–26,
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02634937.2019.1586348?needAccess=true>.
- 7 Human Rights Watch, “Timeline of Ilham Tohti’s Case,” September 15, 2014,
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/timeline-ilham-tohtis-case>.
- 8 ジェウヘル・イリハムへのインタビュー取材（2020年6月2日）
- 9 Radio Free Asia, “Uyghur Scholar Tohti Speaks about His Concerns before Detention,” February 7, 2014, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/interview-02072014182032.html>.
- 10 Human Rights Watch, “Timeline of Ilham Tohti’s Case.” 以下も参照：People.cn, “Police: Ilham Tohti, Instructor from Minzu University of China, Is Involved in Separatist Activities (警方:中央民族大学教师伊力哈木从事分裂活动),” January 25, 2014,
<http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0125/c1001-24226456.html>. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳)
- 11 Human Rights Watch, “Timeline of Ilham Tohti’s Case.”

- 12 Edward Wong, “China Sentences Uighur Scholar to Life,” *New York Times*, September 23, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/asia/china-court-sentences-uighur-scholar-to-life-in-separatism-case.html>.
- 13 Radio Free Asia, “Under the Guise of Public Safety, China Demolishes Thousands of Mosques,” December 19, 2016, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/udner-the-guise-of-public-safety-12192016140127.html>. ガーディアン紙とオンライン報道サイト Bellingcat による衛星画像を利用した調査ではさらに、2016 年から 2018 年にかけて 20 以上の宗教施設が部分的あるいは完全に破壊されたことが明らかになった。以下も参照：Lily Kuo, “Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,” *Guardian*, May 7, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang>.
- 14 著者が雇ったガイドによる説明（カシュガル）
- 15 Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, *China’s Early Mosques* (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 268–70.
- 16 Steinhardt, *China’s Early Mosques*.

第 10 章 AI と監視装置の融合

- 1 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020),” <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/>. オリジナルの中国語バージョン：http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm.
- 2 Charlie Campbell, “How China Is Using ‘Social Credit Scores’ to Reward and Punish Its Citizens,” *Time*, January 16, 2019, <https://time.com/collection-post/5502592/china-social-credit-score/>.
- 3 Celia Hatton, “China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets Up Huge System,” BBC, October 26, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186>.
- 4 Hatton, “China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets Up Huge System.”
- 5 Louise Matsakis, “How the West Got China’s Social Credit System Wrong,” *Wired*, July 29, 2019, <https://www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system/>.
- 6 Ankit Panda, “The Truth about China’s New National Security Law,” *Diplomat*, July 1, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/the-truth-about-chinas-new-national-security-law/>.

- 7 President of the People's Republic of China, "National Security Law of the People's Republic of China (2015)," *China Daily*, December 11, 2017, <http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201812/11/WS5c0f1b56498eefb3fe46e8c9/national-security-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2015-effective.html>.
- 8 Edward Wong, "China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist Rule," *New York Times*, July 1, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/asia/china-approves-sweeping-security-law-bolstering-communist-rule.html>.
- 9 ImageNet, "Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 2015 Results," <http://image-net.org/challenges/LSVRC/2015/results>. 以下も参照 : Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun, "Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition," Cornell University, Science and Engineering Archive, December 10, 2015, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.03385.pdf>.
- 10 "After thirteen amazing years at Microsoft Research, I have joined MEGVII Technology (also known as Face++, in July, 2016) as Chief Scientist and Managing Director of Research," 「マイクロソフト・リサーチですばらしい13年を過ごしたのち、2016年7月にわたしはメグビー・テクノロジー (Face++としても知られる) の主任科学者および研究担当責任者に就任しました」: 孫劍の個人的なホームページ December 20, 2020, <http://www.jiansun.org/>.
- 11 Yiting Sun, "Meet the Company That's Using Face Recognition to Reshape China's Tech Scene," *MIT Technology Review*, August 11, 2017, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/08/11/149962/when-a-face-is-worth-a-billion-dollars/>.
- 12 Charles Rollet, "Infinoa's Xinjiang Business Examined," IPVM, December 7, 2018, <https://ipvm.com/reports/infinoa-xinjiang>.
- 13 Ryan Mac, Rosalind Adams, and Megha Rajagopalan, "US Universities and Retirees Are Funding the Technology behind China's Surveillance State," BuzzFeed News, May 30, 2019, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/us-money-funding-facial-recognition-sensetime-megvii>.
- 14 Reuters, "China to Create \$6.5 Billion Venture Capital Fund to Support Start-ups," January 15, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-venturecapital-idUSKBN0KO05Q20150115>.
- 15 Tom Mitchell, "China to Launch \$6.5bn VC Fund for Emerging Industries Start-ups," *Financial Times*, January 15, 2015, <https://www.ft.com/content/73f216c8-9c97-11e4-a730-00144feabdc0>.
- 16 Cory Bennett and Katie Bo Williams, "US, China Agree to Stop Corporate Hacks," *Hill*, September 25, 2015, <https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/254966-us-china-reach-common-understanding-on-hacking>.
- 17 Robert Farley, "Did the Obama-Xi Cyber Agreement Work?," *Diplomat*, August 11, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/did-the-obama-xi-cyber-agreement-work/>.

18 2016年以降の数多くの研究によって、著者が取材をとおして得たイルファンやそのほかのウイグル人の技術労働者の証言にきわめて高い信憑性があることが明らかになった。参照：Jeffrey Knockel, et al., “We Chat, They Watch: How International Users Unwittingly Build Up WeChat’s Chinese Censorship Apparatus,” Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, May 7, 2020. <https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/we-chat-they-watch/>. 世界でもっとも人気のあるアプリを対象にしたアムネスティ・インターナショナルによる2016年の調査では、プライバシー部門で微信は100点満点中0点。アプリ運営者のテンセントにたいする信用度は、フェイスブック、グーグル、アップルなどよりもはるかに低い最下位だった。アムネスティは、微信のユーザーの通信はほとんど、あるいはまったく暗号化されていないと主張した。くわえてこの調査によって、政府によるユーザー・データ開示の要求への対応について微信が情報を公表していないことも明らかになった。参照：Amnesty International, “How Private Are Your Favourite Messaging Apps?” (イルファンの所属する会社が微信にデータを要求しはじめた時点から) 2年後の2017年9月、くわえて2020年に微信がプライバシー・ポリシーを変更したことは、プライバシー権利擁護団体による疑いが真実だと裏づけるものだった。新しいプライバシー・ポリシーでは、検索ワードや閲覧したプロフィールについての情報を微信が集めていることが明らかになった。さらに、通話の日時や長さ、位置情報などのメタデータも収集されていた。中国の法律にもとづき、それらの情報は警察令状がなくても政府に開示される可能性があった。参照：WeChat, “Privacy Policy,” https://www.wechat.com/en/privacy_policy.html. さらに以下を参照：Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation.” 「2014年5月、中国政府はインスタント・メッセージング・アプリ上の“違法行為、を撲滅するためのタスクフォースを起ち上げた。とくに取り締まりが強化されたのは、『暴力、テロリズム、ポルノにつながる噂や情報』だった。微信やほかのライバル会社のアプリは、政府によるユーザー活動の監視を受け容れることを求められた」

第11章 このうえなく親切なガーさん

iii ハンナ・アーレント『エルサレムのアイヒマン——悪の陳腐さについての報告』新版、大久保和郎訳、みすず書房、2017年、384頁

1 10世帯が互いに監視・通報し合う「双联戸（双連戸）」と呼ばれるこのシステムは、2014年にチベットではじめて導入され、2016年までに新疆ウイグル自治区でも広く運用されるようになった。しかし、メイセムのほか15人のウイグル人取材対象者は、少なくとも2014年ごろから地域自警団による家庭調査や捜索を受けはじめたと証言した。参照：Sarah Tynen, “I Was in China Doing Research When I Saw My Uighur Friends Disappear,” *Conversation*, March 9, 2020, <https://theconversation.com/i-was-in-china-doing-research-when-i-saw-my-uighur-friends->

[disappear-127166](#). 以下も参照： Nectar Gan, “Passports Taken, More Police... New Party Boss Chen Quanguo Acts to Tame Xinjiang with Methods Used in Tibet,” *South China Morning Post*, December 12, 2016, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2053739/party-high-flier-uses-his-tibet-model-bid-tame-xinjiang>.

2 Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region>. ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチの報道の情報源となったオリジナルの中国語資料はネット上から削除された。

3 Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses.”

4 Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses.”

5 *Xinjiang Daily*, “Xinjiang: 2017 Physicals for All Work Has Been Done (新疆：2017 年全民健康体检工作全部完成),” November 2, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/02/content_5236389.htm. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳)

6 Sui-Lee Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People, with the Help of American Expertise,” *New York Times*, February 21, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-ughur-dna-thermo-fisher.html>.

7 Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>. [「中国：少数民族から DNA サンプルを数百万人規模で採取」
<https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2017/12/13/312492>]

8 Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.” 以下も参照：Xinhua, “Healthy Xinjiang: Precisely Reacting to People’s Health Expectations (“健康新疆”：精准对接群众健康期盼),” May 28, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2018-05/28/c_129881863.htm. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳) 新華社通信によると、「全民健康体检」は2016年9月にはじまったという。著者がインタビュー取材した十数人のウイグル人難民は、少なくとも2016年6月ごろから身体検査のために警察署や診療所に呼びだされたと証言した。2017年末までに当局は、計3,634万人にたいしてそれぞれ2回の身体検査とDNAデータ収集を完了した。

9 Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.” [「中国：少数民族から DNA サンプルを数百万人規模で採取」]

10 マーク・ムンステルヘルムへのインタビュー取材 (2020年1月29日)

11 Mark Munsterhjelm, “Scientists Are Aiding Apartheid in China,” *Just Security*, June 18, 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/64605/scientists-are-aiding-apartheid-in-china/>.

- 12 Mark Munsterhjelm, *Living Dead in the Pacific: Contested Sovereignty and Racism in Genetic Research on Taiwan Aborigines* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014).
- 13 ALFRED, Yale University School of Medicine, <https://alfred.med.yale.edu/alfred/index.asp>.
- 14 Munsterhjelm, “Scientists Are Aiding Apartheid in China.”
- 15 Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People.”
- 16 Ailsa Chang, “How Americans—Some Knowingly, Some Unwittingly—Helped China’s Surveillance Grow,” NPR, July 18, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/07/18/743211959/how-americans-some-knowingly-some-unwittingly-helped-chinas-surveillance-grow>.
- 17 Li Caixia, Kenneth Kidd, et al., “A Panel of 74 AISNPs: Improved Ancestry Inference within Eastern Asia,” *Forensic Science International: Genetics* 23, 2016, 101–110, <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27077960/>.
- 18 Yinghong Cheng, “Is Peking Man Still Our Ancestor?”—Genetics, Anthropology, and the Politics of Racial Nationalism in China,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 76, August 2017, 575–602, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/is-peking-man-still-our-ancestorgenetics-anthropology-and-the-politics-of-racial-nationalism-in-china/F7D479FC994A854400A53E0E1B987236>.
- 19 ALFRED, Yale University School of Medicine.
- 20 ALFRED, Yale University School of Medicine.
- 21 キッドはNPR やニューヨーク・タイムズ紙などのメディアに長々と自分の主張を語っているものの、著者による取材依頼には応じなかった。参照：Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People.”
- 22 Thermo Fisher Scientific, “Thermo Fisher Scientific Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results,” January 30, 2019, <https://ir.thermofisher.com/investors/news-and-events/news-releases/news-release-details/2019/Thermo-Fisher-Scientific-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2018-Results/default.aspx>.
- 23 Thermo Fisher Scientific, “Annual Report,” 2017, https://s27.q4cdn.com/797047529/files/doc_financials/2017/ar/2017-Annual-Report.pdf.
- 24 Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People.”
- 25 Karen A. Kirkwood, Karen A. Kirkwood to Arvind Ganesan and Sophie Richardson, letter. From Human Rights Watch, June 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/thermo_fisher_response_.pdf.
- 26 He Wei, Ren Xiaojin, et al., “Xi’s Speech at CIIE Draws Positive Reactions,” *China Daily*, November 5, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/05/WS5bdf891a310eff3032869d9_12.html.

第12章 すべてを見通す眼

- 1 トルコでのインタビュー取材時、メイセムはその用紙をもっていなかった。しかし、何十人も
のウイグル人難民がこの用紙や似たような文書を保管しており、著者に見せてくれた。著者はこれ
らの用紙の写真を保有。
- 2 Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region.”
- 3 Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression,” May 1, 2019,
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>.
- 4 以下のニューヨーク・タイムズ紙の記事のなかで漏洩資料が公表された：Ramzy and Buckley,
“Absolutely No Mercy.” 著者も保有する異なる漏洩資料は、以下の記事で公表された：Bethany
Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by
Algorithm,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, November 24, 2019,
<https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>.
- 5 著者は、ここで引用された新疆関連の漏洩資料の約 400 ページ分を保有。
- 6 Catalin Cimpanu, “Chinese Company Leaves Muslim-Tracking Facial Recognition Database
Exposed Online,” ZDNet, February 15, 2019, <https://www.zdnet.com/article/chinese-company-leaves-muslim-tracking-facial-recognition-database-exposed-online/>.
- 7 Victor Gevers, Twitter post, February 13, 2019, 6:13 p.m.,
<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1096788937492840451>.
- 8 Arjun Kharpal, “Microsoft Says Facial Recognition Firm That Beijing Allegedly Uses to Track
Muslims Is Lying About a ‘Partnership,’” CNBC, March 15, 2019,
<https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/microsoft-facial-recognition-firm-sensenets-lying-about-partnership.html>.
- 9 Shannon Liao, “An Exposed Database Tracked Whether 1.8 Million Chinese Women Were
‘Breed Ready,’” *Verge*, March 11, 2019, <https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/11/18260816/china-exposed-database-breedready-women>.
- 10 Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One’ for Using a Mobile App,” International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, November 24, 2019,
<https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/>.

- 11 Li Zaili, “Religious Belief Is a Crime, Xinjiang Authorities Say,” *Bitter Winter*, October 16, 2018, <https://bitterwinter.org/religious-belief-is-a-crime-for-authorities/>.
- 12 Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One.’”
- 13 Adam Lynn, “App Targeting Uyghur Population Censors Content, Lacks Basic Security,” Open Technology Fund, August 31, 2018, <https://www.opentech.fund/news/app-targeting-uyghur-population-censors-content-lacks-basic-security/>.
- 14 Megha Rajagopalan, “China Is Forcing People to Download an App That Tells Them to Delete ‘Dangerous’ Photos,” BuzzFeed News, April 9, 2018, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-surveillance-app>.

第13章 収監、強制収容所へ

- 1 Nectar Gan, “Passports Taken, More Police.”
- 2 参照 : *Economist*, “Xinjiang: The Race Card,” September 3, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/china/2016/09/03/the-race-card>.
- 3 参照 : Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, “Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 19, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-1513700355>.
- 4 Cpcnews.cn, “Chen Quanguo CV (陈全国同志简历),” October 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/leaders/2017-10/25/c_1121856509.htm.
- 5 Jun Mai, “From Tibet to Xinjiang, Beijing’s Man for Restive Regions Chen Quanguo Is the Prime Target of US Sanctions,” *South China Morning Post*, December 13, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3041810/tibet-xinjiang-beijings-man-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-prime>.
- 6 筆者がインタビュー取材した数十人のウイグル人が、再教育センターに収容されたときに同じ、または非常に似た光景を見たと言った。取材対象者のなかには、メイセムと同じ拘留センターに収容された人物もいた。以下も参照 : Killing and Rajagopalan, “Ex-Prisoners Detail the Horrors of China’s Detention Camps.”
- 7 インタビュー取材のなかで数十人のウイグル人が、収容所のシステムがまだ確立していなかったと考えられる 2016 年末から 2017 年にかけて、複数の収容所を移動させられたと言った。移動について明確な理由はかならずしも示されなかったものの、施設の過密状態が問題のひとつだと

多くの人は考えた。以下も参照：Killing and Rajagopalan, “Ex-Prisoners Detail the Horrors of China’s Detention Camps.”

8 著者やべつのジャーナリストの取材にたいし、新疆の元被拘束者のほぼ全員が、一般的な住宅の居間と同じ広さの監房に収容されたと話した。たいてい15～50人の同房者がおり、2～4台のカメラで監視されていたという。以下も参照：U.S. Department of State, “2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: China—Xinjiang,” <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/xinjiang/>.

9 参照：Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “Leaked China Files Show Internment Camps Are Ruled by Secrecy and Spying,” *New York Times*, November 24, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/world/asia/leak-chinas-internment-camps.html>.

10 著者がインタビュー取材したほかのウイグル人難民たちも、類似する授業を受けたと同じように詳説した。数多くのニュース報道でも、似たようなエピソードが伝えられている。2020年の時点で出てきた証言によると、一部の講師は強制的に働かされていたという。また、収容所での業務内容を事前に十分に説明されていなかったケースもあった。少なくとも元講師のひとりには「二重生活」を受け容れ、偽の忠誠心を示して収容所の業務から抜けだしたと証言した。以下も参照：Ruth Ingram, “Confessions of a Xinjiang Camp Teacher,” *Diplomat*, August 17, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/confessions-of-a-xinjiang-camp-teacher/>.

11 メイセムと同じ収容所にいた元ウイグル人受刑者へのインタビュー取材（2019年9月）。

12 過密状態についてのくわしい情報は以下を参照：Killing and Rajagopalan, “Ex-Prisoners Detail the Horrors of China’s Detention Camps.”

13 新疆ウイグル自治区の当局は宗教指導者を仲間に引き入れ、地域の共産党への支援をより確固たるものにしようと画策している。くわしくは以下を参照：Lily Kuo, “‘If You Enter a Camp, You Never Come Out’: Inside China’s War on Islam,” *Guardian*, January 11, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/if-you-enter-a-camp-you-never-come-out-inside-chinas-war-on-islam>.

第14章 強制収容者たちの日常

1 著者のインタビュー取材のなかで数十人のウイグル人難民が語ったところによると、2016年末から2017年はじめにかけて限定的ながらも家族との面会が許可され、ときには施設を短期間だけ離れて地元の家族に会いに行くこともできたという。この家族との面会の慣行が現在も続いているのかについては、著者の調査でははっきりとはわからなかった。夜間に施設を離れるウイグル人受

刑者の映像については、以下を参照：BBC, “Inside China’s ‘Thought Transformation’ Camps,” June 18, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wmld2ZP3h0c>.

2 トルコは中国政府が定める「26の要注意国」リストに含まれており、それらの国に関係のある新疆住民は監視や再教育の対象となる。参照：Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses.”

3 8人のウイグル人難民、新疆在住のひとりのビジネスマンへのインタビュー取材（2017年12月～2018年2月）

4 Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” *China Brief* 18, no. 4 (March 12, 2018),

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343971146_China%27s_Domestic_Security_Spending_An_Analysis_of_Available_Data.

5 Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude’: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” *Central Asian Survey* 38, no. 1, 102–28, September 5, 2018.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ccas20>. ゼンツが入手した調達文書によると、2016年、ロブノール県（タクラマ

カン砂漠の北側に位置する貧しい地域で、数十年まえに近くで核実験が行なわれた）のある行政区は、「教育訓練をとおした変容のための授業」に参加した約2,000人のうち90%が実際に「変容した」とウェブサイト上で報告した。一方、グルジャ県は「変容率」が85%に達したと主張した。その年の入札案件のなかには、「教育にもとづく脱過激化変容の構築」のために、250万元（約35万5,000ドル）の予算で教室、食堂、警備室、発電室などの設置を求めるものがあつた。参考価格が提示されていないべつ入札では、映像監視制御室、警察監督室、寮、食堂の設置が求められていた。さらに、追加の警備用フェンスや周囲の塀を含む改修と増築を担当する業者を19万元（約3万ドル）の予算で募る入札もあつた。入札案件の最高額は1億300万元（1,470万ドル）で、サッカー場5面以上の3万5,000平方メートルの広さを誇る「法制度変容センター」と呼ばれる施設の建設に関するものだった。

6 Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” *New York Times*, November 24, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/opinion/china-xinjiang-files.html>.

7 Naubet Bisenov, “Kazakhstan-China Deportation Case Sparks Trial of Public Opinion,” *Nikkei Asia*, July 26, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Kazakhstan-China-deportation-case-sparks-trial-of-public-opinion>.

8 サイラグル・サウトバイへのインタビュー取材（2020年7月25日）。著者はまた、2018年7月にはじまった裁判でのサウトバイの法廷証言の一部を録音したスマートフォンのデータを入手。その年のはじめにカザフスタンに不法入国した罪にたいする裁判での彼女の証言には、収容所での

講師としての経験についての大量の情報が含まれている。詳細については以下を参照：Matt Rivers and Lily Lee, “Former Xinjiang Teacher Claims Brainwashing and Abuse Inside Mass Detention Centers,” CNN, May 10, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/09/asia/xinjiang-china-kazakhstan-detention-intl/index.html>.

9 オムル・ベカリへのインタビュー取材（2018年9月）。ベカリは、中国の収容所に拘束された経験についてメディアに詳細を語った最初のカザフスタン市民のひとりだった。以下も参照：

Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” Associated Press, May 18, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b>.

10 *Economist*, “China’s Population: Peak Toil,” January 26, 2013, <https://www.economist.com/china/2013/01/26/peak-toil>.

11 Lily Kuo, “China Transferred Detained Uighurs to Factories Used by Global Brands—Report,” *Guardian*, March 1, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/01/china-transferred-detained-uighurs-to-factories-used-by-global-brands-report>.

12 Amazon, “Amazon’s Updated Response to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Report on Forced Labour of Ethnic Minorities from Xinjiang,” Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, October 2, 2020, <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/amazons-updated-response-to-the-australian-strategic-policy-institutes-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang/>.

13 Eva Dou and Chao Deng, “Western Companies Get Tangled in China’s Muslim Clampdown,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-companies-get-tangled-in-chinas-muslim-clampdown-11558017472>.

14 Foxconn, “Foxconn Walked into Xinjiang Kashgar to Help the Poor (助力精准扶贫 集团走进新疆喀什地区),” December 5, 2018, <http://www.foxconn.com.cn/ComDetailNews69.html>. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳)

15 Ana Swanson, “Banned Chinese Companies Deny Allegations They Abused Uighurs,” *New York Times*, July 21, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/business/china-us-trade-banned.html>. “Apple Cuts Off China’s Ofilm over Xinjiang Labor,” Bloomberg News. March 17, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-17/shares-of-china-s-ofilm-drop-after-firm-loses-foreign-customer>. [日本語の要約記事：「アップルが欧菲光との取引停止、ウイグル族弾圧関与の疑い—関係者」 <https://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articles/2021-03-17/QQ3MCRDWX2PS01>]

16 “Ainur Helps Family Realise ‘Supermarket Dream’ (阿依努尔助力家人实现“超市梦”),” Hotan government (和田政府网), July 31, 2019, <http://archive.ph/DOUK3>. (著者のアシスタントがタイトルを標準中国語から英語に翻訳)

- 17 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, Dr James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser, “Uyghurs for Sale,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale>.
- 18 Dake Kang and Yanan Wang, “Gadgets for Tech Giants Made with Coerced Uighur Labor,” Associated Press, March 5, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/3f9a92b8dfd3cae379b57622dd801dd5>.
- 19 William Yang, “Top Brands ‘Using Forced Uighur Labor’ in China: Report,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 2, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/top-brands-using-forced-uighur-labor-in-china-report/a-52605572>.
- 20 Xu, Cave, Leibold, Munro, and Ruser, “Uyghurs for Sale.”
- 21 “Nike Statement on Xinjiang,” undated, <https://purpose.nike.com/statement-on-xinjiang>.
- 22 Adrian Zenz, “Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton,” Center for Global Policy, December 14, 2020, <https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/20201214-PB-China-Zenz-1.pdf>.
- 23 David Lawder and Dominique Patton, “U.S. Bans Cotton Imports from China Producer XPCC Citing Xinjiang ‘Slave Labor,’” Reuters, December 3, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-idUSKBN28C38V>.
- 24 National Retail Federation, “Joint statement from NRF, AAFA, FDRA, RILA and USFIA on Reports of Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” press release, March 10, 2020, <https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/joint-statement-nrf-aafa-fdra-rila-and-usfia-reports-forced-labor>.
- 25 Dake Kang and Yanan Wang, “China’s Uighurs Told to Share Beds, Meals with Party Members,” Associated Press, December 1, 2018, <https://apnews.com/article/9ca1c29fc9554c1697a8729bba4dd93b>.
- 26 People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: Human Rights in Xinjiang—Development and Progress,” Xinhua, June 1, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/01/c_136331805_2.htm.
- 27 Reuters, “China Official Says Xinjiang’s Muslims Are ‘Happiest in World,’” August 25, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/china-official-says-xinjiangs-muslims-are-happiest-in-world-idUSKCN1B50ID>.
- 28 Alim Seytoff and Paul Eckert, “UN Sidesteps Tough US Criticism on Counterterrorism Chief’s Trip to Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, June 17, 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-un-06172019173344.html>.
- iv ジョージ・オーウェル『一九八四年』高橋和久訳、早川書房、2009年、11頁

- 29 Bloomberg News, “Face-Recognition Startup Megvii Said to Raise \$100 Million,” December 6, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-06/china-face-recognition-startup-megvii-said-to-raise-100-million>.
- 30 Steven Millward, “Tencent’s Biggest Investments This Year,” *Tech in Asia*, December 28, 2016, <https://www.techinasia.com/tencent-biggest-investments-2016>.
- 31 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 1–2. [『AI 世界秩序』 12 頁]
- 32 James Somers, “The Friendship That Made Google Huge,” *New Yorker*, December 3, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/10/the-friendship-that-made-google-huge>.
- 33 Tim Bradshaw, “Google Buys UK Artificial Intelligence Start-up,” *Financial Times*, January 27, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/f92123b2-8702-11e3-aa31-00144feab7de>.
- 34 Amy Webb, *The Big Nine: How the Tech Titans and Their Thinking Machines Could Warp Humanity* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 47. [エイミー・ウェブ『BIG NINE 巨大ハイテク企業と AI が支配する人類の未来』 稲垣みどり訳、光文社、2020 年、66-67 頁]
- 35 DeepMind, “Match 1—Google DeepMind Challenge Match: Lee Sedol vs AlphaGo,” posted by YouTube user DeepMind on March 9, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFr3K2DORc8&t=1670>. この映像は、5 番勝負の第 1 局のもの。DeepMind のチャンネルにほかの 4 局の映像も含まれている。
- 36 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 1–2. [『AI 世界秩序』 12-14 頁]

第 15 章 ビッグ・ブレイン

- 1 Koran 2:191. [『コーラン (上)』 井筒俊彦訳、岩波書店、1957 年、54-55 頁]
- 2 参照 : Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” *Journal of Law and Religion* 3, no. 2 (1985): 381–97, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1051182?seq=1>.
- 3 メグビー幹部へのインタビュー取材 (2020 年 5 月 31 日)
- 4 Sam Byford, “AlphaGo Beats Ke Jie Again to Wrap Up Three-Part Match,” *Verge*, May 25, 2017, <https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/25/15689462/alphago-ke-jie-game-2-result-google-deepmind-china>.
- 5 Kai-fu Lee, *AI Superpowers*, 1–2. [『AI 世界秩序』 11 頁]
- 6 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “The National Intelligence Law (中华人民共和国国家情报法),” June 27, 2017. http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2017-06/28/content_4783851.htm. 著者は以下の英語翻訳版を利用 : <https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/>. [日本語訳は

以下より：国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション「中国の国家情報法」国立国会図書館、調査及び立法考査局、海外立法情報調査室・主任調査員 岡村志嘉子

https://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_11000634_po_02740005.pdf?contentNo=1&alternativeNo=] この法律の第7条の解釈については以下を参照：Bonnie Girard, “The Real Danger of China’s National Intelligence Law,” *Diplomat*, February 23, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/>.

7 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” in *Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents Volume 147: Assessing the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy*, edited by Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 253–304. [日本語訳は以下を参考に訳者が翻訳：ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所「19回党大会報告の経済的意義」田中修

https://www.ide.go.jp/library/Japanese/Researchers/report/tanaka_osamu/pdf/2017/t_report171128.pdf]

8 China Plus, “SenseTime Becomes Fifth Member of China’s AI ‘National Team,’” September 26, 2018, <http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20180926/188677.html>.

9 Scott Pelley, “Facial and Emotional Recognition: How One Man Is Advancing Artificial Intelligence,” *60 Minutes*, CBS News, January 13, 2019, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-ai-facial-and-emotional-recognition-how-one-man-is-advancing-artificial-intelligence/>.

第16章 ここで死ぬかもしれない

v 『一九八四年』408頁

1 ウイグル人およびカザフ人難民16人が、イリハム・トフティをはじめとする新疆の著名人を非難する同様のプロパガンダ映像を見たと言明した。

2 2016年末から2017年にかけて中国から脱出したウイグル人難民は誰もが、著者とのインタビューのなかで、出国の許可を取りつけるために数多くの役所を訪れ、迷路のごとく複雑な書類を用意しなければいけなかったと語った。とくに、2018年夏に行なった何十時間にもおよぶインタビュー取材のなかで詩人タヒル・ハムットは、署名をもらうために出向く必要があった役所や複雑な官僚制度についての洞察力に富んだ詳細な情報を教えてくれた。

3 Xun Zhou, “The History of the People’s Republic of China—Through 70 Years of Mass Parades,” *Conversation*, September 30, 2019, <https://theconversation.com/amp/the-history-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-through-70-years-of-mass-parades-123727>.

4 メイセムと著者は相談のうえ、彼女が中国脱出のために使ったルートについての重要な詳細を伏せ、一部を不明瞭にすることを決めた。家族のつながりを通じてメイセムは、多くの人々から助けを借りながら脱出ルートを進んでいった。当局の監視から逃れるためには、かかわった全員が大きなリスクを冒す必要があった。著者が取材したウイグル人難民たちもまた、メイセムの出国と同じ時期に存在したインドへのさまざまなルートについて説明し、それが非常に困難で危険な道のりだったと語った。しかしインドルートの方が、ウルムチからトルコへの飛行機での脱出よりもより危険が少ないと考えられていた。勇敢にもメイセムを助けた人々を危険にさらすことを避けるため、彼女の脱出ルートの詳細については公表を控えることを決めた。

5 Agence France-Presse, “Wrecked Mosques, Police Watch: A Tense Ramadan in Xinjiang,” June 5, 2019, <https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1689848>. 非営利団体 Earthrise Alliance が集めた衛星画像には、モスク、墓地、霊廟が破壊されたあとに建てられた公共の集会場が写っていた。

第17章 心の牢獄

- 1 メイセムの友人へのインタビュー取材（トルコ・アンカラ、2019年11月5日）
- 2 Koran 2:156. [『コーラン（上）』45頁]
- 3 メッセージは著者が保有。
- 4 メイセムは、近況の投稿の履歴を著者に見せてくれた。投稿の履歴の写真を著者は保有。
- 5 メイセムは、これらの微信のメッセージを著者に見せてくれた。

第18章 新しい冷戦

- 1 以下も参照：Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Ankara—the Mausoleum of Atatürk,” <https://www.ktb.gov.tr/EN-103960/ankara---anitkabir-aturks-mausoleum.html>.
- 2 Shu-Ching Jean Cheng, “SenseTime: The Faces behind China’s Artificial Intelligence Unicorn.”
- 3 Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants.”
- 4 IPVM, “Huawei/Megvii Uyghur Alarms,” December 8, 2020, <https://ipvm.com/reports/huawei-megvii-uygur>.
- 5 Consumer Technology Association, “Huawei’s Richard Yu Announced as CES 2018 Keynote Speaker,” October 24, 2017, <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171024005527/en/Huawei%E2%80%99s-Richard-Yu-Announced-CES-2018-Keynote>.

- 6 Vlad Savov, "Huawei's CEO Going Off-Script to Rage at US Carriers Was the Best Speech of CES," *Verge*, January 9, 2018, <https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/9/16871538/huawei-ces-2018-event-ceo-richard-yu-keynote-speech>.
- 7 "Indictment," *United States of America v. Huawei Device Co., Ltd., and Huawei Device USA, Inc.*, case no. 2:19-cr-00010-RSM (U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle), January 16, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1124996/download>.
- 8 Hiroko Tabuchi, "T-Mobile Accuses Huawei of Theft from Laboratory," *New York Times*, September 5, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/business/t-mobile-accuses-huawei-of-theft-from-laboratory.html>.
- 9 "Court's Verdict Form," *T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., et al.*, case no. 2:14-cv-01351-RAJ (U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle), May 18, 2017, <http://www.columbia.edu/~ma820/Huawei.484.pdf>.
- 10 U.S. Department of Justice, "Chinese Telecommunications Device Manufacturer and Its U.S. Affiliate Indicted for Theft of Trade Secrets, Wire Fraud, and Obstruction of Justice," press release, January 28, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-theft-trade>.
- 11 "Indictment," *United States of America v. Huawei Device Co., Ltd., and Huawei Device USA, Inc.*, case no. 2:19-cr-00010-RSM.
- 12 Katie Collins, "Pentagon Bans Sale of Huawei, ZTE Phones on US Military Bases," *CNET*, May 2, 2018, <https://www.cnet.com/news/pentagon-reportedly-bans-sale-of-huawei-and-zte-phones-on-us-military-bases/>.
- 13 Michael Slezak and Ariel Bogle, "Huawei Banned from 5G Mobile Infrastructure Rollout in Australia," Australia Broadcasting Corporation, August 23, 2018, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/huawei-banned-from-providing-5g-mobile-technology-australia/10155438>.
- 14 Tasneem Akolawala, "Huawei Says Shipped 100 Million Smartphones in 2018 Already, Aims to Cross 200 Million," *Gadgets 360*, NDTV, July 19, 2018, <https://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/news/huawei-100-million-smartphone-sales-2018-1886358>.
- 15 Steven Musil, "Huawei Knocks Off Apple to Become No. 2 Phone Seller," *CNET*, August 1, 2018, <https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-knocks-off-apple-iphone-to-become-no-2-phone-seller/>.
- 16 Lucy Hornby, Sherry Fei Ju, and Louise Lucas, "China Cracks Down on Tech Credit Scoring," *Financial Times*, February 4, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/f23e0cb2-07ec-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5>.

- 17 Lily Kuo, "China Bans 23M from Buying Travel Tickets as Part of 'Social Credit' System," *Guardian*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/01/china-bans-23m-discredited-citizens-from-buying-travel-tickets-social-credit-system>.
- 18 Joe McDonald, "China Bars Millions from Travel for 'Social Credit' Offenses," Associated Press, February 23, 2019, <https://apnews.com/article/9d43f4b74260411797043ddd391c13d8>.
- 19 Genia Kostka, "China's Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval," *New Media & Society* 21, no. 7 (February 2019), 1565-93, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444819826402>.
- 20 Heather Timmons, "No One Can Say for Sure What Trump and Xi Just Agreed To," *Quartz*, December 4, 2018, <https://qz.com/1482634/no-one-knows-what-trump-and-xi-agreed-to-at-the-g20/>.
- 21 Kate O'Keeffe and Stu Woo, "Canadian Authorities Arrest CFO of Huawei Technologies at U.S. Request," *Wall Street Journal*, December 5, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/canadian-authorities-arrest-cfo-of-huawei-technologies-at-u-s-request-1544048781>.
- 22 Steve Stecklow and Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Exclusive: Huawei Hid Business Operation in Iran after Reuters Reported Links to CFO," Reuters, June 3, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-iran-probe-exclusive-idUSKBN23A19B>.
- 23 Vipal Monga and Kim Mackrael, "Court Filings Shed New Light on Arrest of Huawei Executive," *Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-filings-shed-new-light-on-arrest-of-huawei-executive-11566581148>.
- 24 Gordon Corera, "Meng Wanzhou: The PowerPoint That Sparked an International Row," BBC, September 24, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54270739>.
- 25 Robert Fife and Steven Chase, "Inside the Final Hours That Led to the Arrest of Huawei Executive Meng Wanzhou," *Globe and Mail*, November 30, 2019, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-inside-the-final-hours-that-led-to-the-arrest-of-huawei-executive-meng/>.
- 26 Yong Xiong and Susannah Cullinane, "China Summons US, Canadian Ambassadors in 'Strong Protest' over Huawei CFO's Arrest," CNN, December 9, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/09/tech/huawei-cfo-china-summons-ambassador/index.html>.
- 27 Keegan Elmer and Catherine Wong, "Canadian Michael Kovrig Held in China for Allegedly Endangering National Security," *South China Morning Post*, December 12, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2177585/chinese-state-security-behind-detention-canadian-former>.

- 28 Agence France-Presse, “China Charges Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor under National Security Law, 18 Months after Arrest,” June 19, 2020, <https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/19/china-charges-canadians-michael-kovrig-and-michael-spavor-with-spying-18-months-after-arrest/>.
- 29 Steven Lee Myers and Dan Bilefsky, “Second Canadian Arrested in China, Escalating Diplomatic Feud,” *New York Times*, December 12, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/world/asia/michael-spavor-canadian-detained-china.html>.
- 30 Gravitas Ventures, “Dennis Rodman’s Big Bang in Pyongyang,” January 2015.
- 31 Geoffrey Cain, “Watch Out, Kim Jong Un: Wrestler Antonio Inoki Is Bringing Slap to N. Korea,” *NBC News*, August 12, 2014, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/watch-out-kim-jong-un-wrestler-antonio-inoki-bringing-slap-n178396>.
- 32 Lu Shaye, “On China, Has Canada Lost Its Sense of Justice?” *Globe and Mail*, December 13, 2018, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-on-china-has-canada-lost-its-sense-of-justice/>.
- 33 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Two Canadians Detained in China for Four Months Prevented from Going Outside, Official Says,” *Globe and Mail*, April 10, 2019, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-two-canadians-detained-in-china-are-prevented-from-seeing-the-sun-or/>.
- 34 マイケル・コブリグとマイケル・スパバー釈放への働きかけに関与したカナダ人外交官へのインタビュー取材（2019年4月14日）
- 35 Darren J. Lim and Victor Ferguson, “Chinese Economic Coercion During the THAAD Dispute,” *Asan Forum*, December 28, 2019, <http://www.theasanforum.org/chinese-economic-coercion-during-the-thaad-dispute/>.
- 36 *Korea Herald* and *Asia News Network*, “South Korea’s Lotte Seeks to Exit China after Investing \$9.6 Billion, as Thaad Fallout Ensues,” March 13, 2019, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-lotte-seeks-to-exit-china-after-investing-96-billion>.
- 37 Yonhap News Agency, “Lotte Group Hoping for Biz Comeback on S. Korea–China Thaw,” November 1, 2017, <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20171101003400320>.
- 38 David Shepardson and Diane Bartz, “Exclusive: White House Mulls New Year Executive Order to Bar Huawei, ZTE Purchases,” Reuters, December 27, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-huawei-tech-exclusive-idUSKCN1OQ09P>.
- 39 US Congress, Senate, A Bill to Establish the Office of Critical Technologies and Security, and for Other Purposes, S.29, 116th Congress, 1st session, introduced in the Senate on January 4, 2019, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/29>.

- 40 “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” White House, May 15, 2019, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/>.
- 41 Tom Warren, “Microsoft Allowed to Sell Software to Huawei Once Again,” *Verge*, November 22, 2019, <https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/22/20977446/microsoft-huawei-us-export-license-windows-office-software>.
- 42 T. C. Sottek, “Google Pulls Huawei’s Android License, Forcing It to Use Open Source Version,” *Verge*, May 19, 2019, <https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/19/18631558/google-huawei-android-suspension>.
- 43 Sean Keane, “Vodafone Found Hidden Backdoors in Huawei Equipment, Says Report,” *CNET*, April 30, 2019, <https://www.cnet.com/news/british-carrier-vodafone-found-hidden-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment-says-report/>. この記事は、ボーダフォンが2011年の時点で、ファーウェイの機器内にバックドアがあることを発見したと報じている。ボーダフォンとファーウェイの両社は、バックドア問題に適切に対処したと主張した。
- 44 U.S. Department of Justice, “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Announces Charges against Chinese Hackers,” press release, December 20, 2018, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-announces-charges-against-chinese-hackers>.
- 45 Adam Satariono and Joanna Berendt, “Poland Arrests 2, Including Huawei Employee, Accused of Spying for China,” *New York Times*, January 11, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/world/europe/poland-china-huawei-spy.html>.
- 46 米司法省は、ワシントン州シアトルとニューヨークのそれぞれ異なる容疑にたいして起訴状を提出した。参照：“Indictment,” *United States of America v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Huawei Device USA, Inc., Skycom Tech Co. Ltd., and Wanzhou Meng*, case no. 18-457 (S-2) (AMD) (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York), January 24, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1125021/download>. 以下も参照：“Indictment,” *United States of America v. Huawei Device Co., Ltd., and Huawei Device USA, Inc.*, case no. 2:19-cr-00010-RSM.
- 47 Dale Smith, “China’s Envoy to Canada Says Huawei 5G Ban Would Have Repercussions,” *Reuters*, January 18, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-canada-diplomacy/chinas-envoy-to-canada-says-huawei-5g-ban-would-have-repercussions-idUSKCN1PB2L2>.

第19章 大いなる断絶

- 1 US Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing: Chinas Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control, May 16, 2019, <https://intelligence.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=632>.
- 2 John Bolton, *The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020), 312. [ジョン・ボルトン『ジョン・ボルトン回顧録 トランプ大統領との453日』梅原季哉監訳、関根光宏・三宅康雄ほか訳、朝日新聞出版、2020年、345頁] 以下も参照： Alan Rappeport and Edward Wong, “In Push for Trade Deal, Trump Administration Shelves Sanctions over China’s Crackdown on Uighurs,” *New York Times*, May 4, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/world/asia/trump-china-uighurs-trade-deal.html>.
- 3 UK House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Oral Evidence: UK Telecommunications Infrastructure, HC 2200, June 10, 2019, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/uk-telecommunications-infrastructure/oral/102931.pdf>.
- 4 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Huawei’s Partnership with China on Surveillance Technology Raises Concerns for Foreign Users,” *Globe and Mail*, May 14, 2018, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-huaweis-partnership-with-china-on-surveillance-raises-concerns-for/>.
- 5 Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants.”
- 6 Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of China’s Tech Giants.”
- 7 US Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce Adds 28 Chinese Organizations to Its Entity List,” press release, October 7, 2019, <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-commerce-adds-28-chinese-organizations-its-entity-list>.
- 8 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Supplement No. 4 to Part 744—ENTITY LIST,” December 18, 2020, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list>.
- 9 Zhang Dong, “Xinjiang’s Tens-of-Billion-Scale Security Market, the Integration Giant Tells You How to Get Your Share,” *Leiphone*, August 31, 2017, <https://www.leiphone.com/news/201708/LcdGuMZ5n7k6sepy.html>. オックスフォード大学の博士課程の学生ジェフリー・デイン (Jeffrey Ding) が、自身が運営するウェブサイト「ChinAI Newsletter」のために記事を翻訳：
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/13GCpUPrJzu9ipZgPtFDrofTI1kyXk4Op6qTUBhTSpqk/edit#>.

- 10 Paul Mozur, "One Month, 50,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority," *New York Times*, April 14, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html>.
- 11 Chinese Security & Protection Industry Association (中国安防行业网), "Megvii (Face++) SkyEye System (旷视科技(Face++)天眼系统)," January 17, 2017, http://www.21csp.com.cn/zhanti/2017znfx/article/article_15000.html. 2016年の元のリンクはいつたん削除され、2017年1月17日に再掲載された。
- 12 Naomi Xu Elegant, "3 of China's Leading A.I. Firms Land on U.S.'s Latest Blacklist," *Fortune*, October 8, 2019, <https://fortune.com/2019/10/08/china-ai-us-entity-list/>.
- 13 Charles Rollet, "Evidence of Hikvision's Involvement with Xinjiang IJOP and Re-Education Camps," IPVM, October 2, 2018, <https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-xinjiang>.
- 14 Charles Rollet, "Hikvision Wins Chinese Government Forced Facial Recognition Project Across 967 Mosques," IPVM, July 16, 2018, <https://ipvm.com/reports/hik-mosques>.
- 15 Ben Dooley, "Chinese Firms Cash in on Xinjiang's Growing Police State," Agence France-Presse, June 27, 2018, <https://www.afp.com/en/chinese-firms-cash-xinjiangs-growing-police-state>.
- 16 Huawei, "5G Opening Up New Business Opportunities," Huawei white paper, August 2016, <https://www-file.huawei.com/-/media/corporate/pdf/x-lab/10-5g-opening-up-new-business-opportunities-en.pdf?la=en>.
- 17 Stu Woo and Kate O'Keeffe, "Washington Asks Allies to Drop Huawei," *Wall Street Journal*, November 23, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-1542965105>.
- 18 Steve McCaskill, "US Wants to Help Ericsson, Nokia and Others Develop 5G Alternatives," *TechRadar*, February 17, 2020, <https://www.techradar.com/news/us-wants-to-help-ericsson-nokia-and-others-develop-5g-alternatives>.
- 19 Reuters, "U.S., Allied Firms Testing Alternatives to Chinese 5G Technology: Esper," February 15, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-esper-5g/u-s-allied-firms-testing-alternatives-to-chinese-5g-technology-esper-idUSKBN2090A3>.
- 20 Aimee Chanthadavong, "Huawei Australia Sees 5G Ban Start to Bite as Carrier Business Down 21% for 2019," ZDNet, May 1, 2020, <https://www.zdnet.com/article/huawei-australia-sees-5g-ban-start-to-bite-as-carrier-business-down-20-for-2019/>.
- 21 Fergus Hunter, "Huawei Ban a 'Thorny Issue' Hurting China-Australia Relations, Says Ambassador," *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 17, 2020, <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/huawei-ban-a-thorny-issue-hurting-china-australia-relations-says-ambassador-20200217-p541ic.html>.

- 22 BBC Newsnight, "Hong Kong: Mass Protests Turn Violent but China Says Story Is 'Distorted,'" June 13, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1009&v=SMTc8ml5yo0&feature=youtube>.
- 23 Katie Collins, "Huawei Gets 5G Go-Ahead in UK, with Some Hard Limits," CNET, January 28, 2020, <https://www.cnet.com/news/uk-gives-huawei-green-light-to-build-countrys-non-core-5g-network/>.
- 24 Ben Riley-Smith, "US Spy Planes Could Be Pulled from Britain as White House Conducts Major Huawei Review," *Telegraph*, May 4, 2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/05/04/us-spy-planes-could-pulled-britain-white-house-conducts-major/>.
- 25 Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, "Watching Huawei's 'Safe Cities,'" Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 4, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/watching-huaweis-safe-cities>.
- 26 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, "Dealing with Demand for China's Global Surveillance Exports," Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200428_china_surveillance_greitens_v3.pdf.
- 27 Yau Tsz Yan, "Smart Cities or Surveillance? Huawei in Central Asia," *Diplomat*, August 7, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/smart-cities-or-surveillance-huawei-in-central-asia/>
- 28 Joe Parkinson, Nicholas Bariyo, and Josh Chin, "Huawei Technicians Helped African Governments Spy on Political Opponents," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017>.
- 29 Samuel Woodhams, "Huawei Says Its Surveillance Tech Will Keep African Cities Safe but Activists Worry It'll Be Misused," *Quartz Africa*, March 21, 2020, <https://qz.com/africa/1822312/huaweis-surveillance-tech-in-africa-worries-activists/>.
- 30 Brahma Chellaney, "China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy," *Project Syndicate*, January 23, 2017, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01>.
- 31 Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, "It Doesn't Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid," *New York Times*, December 24, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html>.
- 32 BBC News, "Kazakhstan's Land Reform Protests Explained," April 28, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103>.

- 33 Daniel C. O'Neill, "Risky Business: The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in Kazakhstan," in *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5, no. 2 (July 2014), 145–56, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366514000086>.
- 34 Eleanor Albert, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2015, <https://www.cfr.org/background/shanghai-cooperation-organization>.
- 35 サイラグル・サウトバイ、サリクジャン・ビラシ、アタジュルトの元メンバー1名へのインタビュー取材 (2020年1月～7月)。同じエピソードは以下にも登場: Ben Mauk, "Diary: Prison in the Mountains," *London Review of Books*, August 2018, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v41/n18/ben-mauk/diary>.
- 36 Kiran Stacey, "Pakistan Shuns US for Chinese High-Tech Weapons," *Financial Times*, April 18, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/8dbce0a0-3713-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8>.
- 37 Henney Sender and Kiran Stacey, "China Takes 'Project of the Century' to Pakistan," *Financial Times*, May 17, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/05979e18-2fe4-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a>.
- 38 Stacey, "Pakistan Shuns US for Chinese High-Tech Weapons."
- 39 Peter Frankopan, *The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World* (New York: Vintage, 2018), 12–13.

第20章 安全な場所など存在しない

- 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, "Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding Serious Human Rights Violations Perpetrated against Uighur Turks and the Passing Away of Folk Poet Abdurrehim Heyit," February 9, 2019, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-06_-uygur-turklerine-yonelik-agir-insan-haklari-ihlalleri-ve-abdurrehim-heyit-in-vefati-hk.en.mfa.
- 2 Carlotta Gall and Jack Ewing, "Tensions between Turkey and U.S. Soar as Trump Orders New Sanctions," *New York Times*, August 10, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/business/turkey-erdogan-economy-lira.html>.
- 3 Masanori Tobita, "China Money Flows into Turkey as Crisis Creates Opening," *Nikkei Asia*, August 22, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-money-flows-into-Turkey-as-crisis-creates-opening>.
- 4 Kerim Karakaya and Asli Kandemir, "Turkey Got a \$1 Billion Foreign Cash Boost from China in June," Bloomberg News, August 9, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-09/turkey-got-1-billion-from-china-swap-in-june-boost-to-reserves>.

- 5 著者が新聞を保有。
- 6 Ayla Jean Yackley and Christian Shepherd, “Turkey’s Uighurs Fear for Future after China Deportation,” *Financial Times*, August 24, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/caee8cac-c3f4-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9>.
- 7 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Letter Dated 8 July 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council,” 41st session, agenda item 2, July 23, 2019, https://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/E/HRC/c_gov/A_HRC_41_G_11.DOCX.
- 8 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Letter Dated 12 July 2019 from the Representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Pluri-national State of Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the State of Palestine to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council,” 41st session, agenda item 3, August 9, 2019, https://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/E/HRC/c_gov/A_HRC_41_G_17.DOCX.

エピローグ パノプティコンを止めろ

- 1 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932). [オルダス・ハクスリー『すばらしい新世界』大森望訳、早川書房、2017年など]
- 2 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1949). [ジョージ・オーウェル『一九八四年』高橋和久訳、早川書房、2009年など]
- 3 John Brunner, *Stand on Zanzibar* (New York: Doubleday, 1968).
- 4 Ray Kurzweil, “Singularity Q&A,” Kurzweil Library, September 2005, <https://www.kurzweilai.net/singularity-q-a>.

- 5 Natasha Singer and Cade Metz, “Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are Biased, Says U.S. Study,” *New York Times*, December 19, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/facial-recognition-bias.html>. 詳細な報告書は以下 : Patrick Grother, Mei Ngan, and Kayee Hanaoka, “Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT): Part 3: Demographic Effects,” National Institute of Standards and Technology at the U.S. Department of Commerce,” December 2019, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf>.
- 6 Mark Puente, “LAPD Pioneered Predicting Crime with Data. Many Police Don’t Think It Works,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 3, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-precision-policing-data-20190703-story.html>.
- 7 World Health Organization, “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China,” January 5, 2020, <https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/>.
- 8 Rafi Letzter, “The Coronavirus Didn’t Really Start at the Wuhan ‘Wet Market’,” *Live Science*, May 28, 2020, <https://www.livescience.com/covid-19-did-not-start-at-wuhan-wet-market.html>.
- 9 Aylin Woodward, “At Least 5 People in China Have Disappeared, Gotten Arrested, or Been Silenced after Speaking Out about the Coronavirus—Here’s What We Know About Them,” *Business Insider*, February 21, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-coronavirus-whistleblowers-speak-out-vanish-2020-2>.
- 10 Jeff Kao, Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur and Aaron Krolik, “Leaked Documents Show How China’s Army of Paid Internet Trolls Helped Censor the Coronavirus,” *ProPublica* and *New York Times*, December 19, 2020, <https://www.propublica.org/article/leaked-documents-show-how-chinas-army-of-paid-internet-trolls-helped-censor-the-coronavirus>.
- 11 Associated Press, “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO,” June 2, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/3c061794970661042b18d5aeaed9fae>.
- 12 Steven Erlanger, “Global Backlash Builds against China over Coronavirus,” *New York Times*, May 3, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/world/europe/backlash-china-coronavirus.html>.
- 13 US Consulate General in Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China, “Event: Discrimination against African-Americans in Guangzhou,” April 13, 2020, <https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/health-alert-u-s-consulate-general-guangzhou-peoples-republic-of-china/>.
- 14 Lijian Zhao, Twitter post, March 12, 2020, 10:37 p.m. Beijing time, <https://twitter.com/zlj517/status/1238111898828066823>.
- 15 Selam Gebredikan, “For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More Power,” *New York Times*, March 30, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html>.

- 16 Krystal Hu and Jeffrey Dastin, “Exclusive: Amazon Turns to Chinese Firms on U.S. Blacklist to Meet Thermal Camera Needs,” Reuters, April 29, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-amazon-com-cameras-idUSKBN22B1AL>.
- 17 Sam Biddle, “Police Surveilled George Floyd Protests with Help from Twitter-Affiliated Startup Dataminr,” *Intercept*, July 9, 2020, <https://theintercept.com/2020/07/09/twitter-dataminr-police-spy-surveillance-black-lives-matter-protests/>.
- 18 IBM, “IBM CEO’s Letter to Congress on Racial Justice Reform,” June 8, 2020, <https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/facial-recognition-sunset-racial-justice-reforms/>.
- 19 Amazon, “We Are Implementing a One-Year Moratorium on Police Use of Rekognition,” June 11, 2020, <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/we-are-implementing-a-one-year-moratorium-on-police-use-of-rekognition>.
- 20 Jay Greene, “Microsoft Won’t Sell Police Its Facial-Recognition Technology, Following Similar Moves by Amazon and IBM,” *Washington Post*, June 11, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/11/microsoft-facial-recognition/>.
- 21 Javier C. Hernández, “China Locks Down Xinjiang to Fight Covid-19, Angering Residents,” *New York Times*, August 25, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-covid.html>.
- 22 Dake Kang, “In China’s Xinjiang, Forced Medication Accompanies Lockdown,” Associated Press, August 31, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/309c576c6026031769fd88f4d86fda89>.
- 23 Bloomberg News, “Huawei Employees see Dire Threat to Future from Latest Trump Salvo,” June 8, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-07/huawei-troops-see-dire-threat-to-future-from-latest-trump-salvo>.
- 24 Zhaoyin Feng, “Chinese Students Face Increased Scrutiny at US Airports,” BBC Chinese Service, September 5, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54016278>.
- 25 Ishan Banerjee and Matt Sheehan, “America’s Got AI Talent: US’ Big Lead in AI Research Is Built on Importing Researchers,” MacroPolo, June 9, 2020, <https://macropolo.org/americas-got-ai-talent-us-big-lead-in-ai-research-is-built-on-importing-researchers/?rp=m>.
- 26 Michael Zennie, “Hong Kong Democracy Activist Joshua Wong Jailed after Pleading Guilty to 2019 Protest Charges,” *Time*, November 23, 2020, <https://time.com/5914785/joshua-wong-jailed-hong-kong/>.
- 27 Yimou Lee, David Lague, and Ben Blanchard, “Special Report: China Launches ‘Gray-Zone’ Warfare to Subdue Taiwan,” Reuters, December 10, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-taiwan-military-idUSKBN28K1GS>.

- 28 Karen Leigh, Peter Martin, and Adrian Leung, “Troubled Waters: Where the U.S. and China Could Clash in the South China Sea,” *Bloomberg*, December 17, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-south-china-sea-miscalculation/>.
- 29 David Crawshaw and Miriam Berger, “China Beat Back Covid-19 in 2020. Then It Really Flexed Its Muscles at Home and Abroad,” *Washington Post*, December 28, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/12/28/china-2020-major-stories/>.
- 30 Michelle Toh, “China’s Tariffs Slam Door Shut on Australian Wine’s Biggest Export Market,” CNN.com, November 30, 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/30/business/australia-china-wine-tariffs-intl-hnk/index.html>.
- 31 Shohret Hoshur, “Self-Proclaimed Uyghur Former Chinese Spy Shot by Unknown Assailant in Turkey,” Radio Free Asia, November 3, 2020, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/spy-11032020175523.html>.
- 32 Helen Davidson, “Pressure on Turkey to Protect Uighurs as China Ratifies Extradition Treaty,” *Guardian*, December 29, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/29/pressure-on-turkey-to-protect-uighurs-as-china-ratifies-extradition-treaty>.
- 33 Victor Ordonez, “Chinese Embassy Tweet about Uighurs and Birth Rate Draws Instant Condemnation,” ABC News, January 8, 2021, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/chinese-embassy-tweet-uighurs-birth-rate-draws-instant/story?id=75118569>.
- 34 Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, “U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide,’” *New York Times*, January 19, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html>.
- 35 Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone’: Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,” BBC News, February 2, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071>.
- 36 Leyland Cecco, “Canada Votes to Recognize China’s Treatment of Uighur Population as Genocide,” *Guardian*, February 22, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/22/canada-china-uighur-muslims-genocide>.

謝辭

- 1 Ohm Youngmisuk, “LeBron James: Daryl Morey Was ‘Misinformed’ before Sending Tweet about China and Hong Kong,” ESPN, October 15, 2019,

https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/27847951/daryl-morey-was-misinformed-sending-tweet-china-hong-kong.

2 Tim Bontemps, "NBA, NBPA announce playoffs to resume Saturday, new initiatives," ESPN, August 29, 2020. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/29759939/nba-announces-playoffs-resume-saturday. Patrick Brzeski, "It's Official: China Overtakes North America as World's Biggest Box Office in 2020," *Hollywood Reporter*, October 18, 2020, <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/its-official-china-overtakes-north-america-as-worlds-biggest-box-office-in-2020>.

3 BBC News, "Censored Bond film *Skyfall* Opens in China," January 21, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21115987>.

4 BBC News, "Disney Criticised for filming *Mulan* in China's Xinjiang Province," September 7, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-54064654>.

5 Jonathan Shieber, "Zoom Admits to Shutting Down Activist Accounts at the Request of the Chinese Government," *TechCrunch*, June 12, 2020, <https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/11/zoom-admits-to-shutting-down-activist-accounts-at-the-request-of-the-chinese-government/>.

6 Nicole Hong, "Zoom Executive Accused of Disrupting Calls at China's Behest," *New York Times*, December 18, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/18/technology/zoom-tiananmen-square.html>.